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Copyright and the Holocaust
Guy Pessach & Michal Shur-Ofry*
This article explores the interface between copyright law and the
Holocaust. The Holocaust's duration and scope, its occurrence in the
midst of the twentieth century with photography and film technologies
already available, and its setting at the heart of Europe, yielded countless
documents, diaries, notes, memoirs, musical works, photographs, films,
letters, and additional artifacts. On the victims' part, many of those
items-including secret archives comprised at various ghettos, music
composed in concentration camps, and personal diaries-manifest an
explicit act of real-time historical documentation for future generations.
On the perpetrators' side, some materials were produced as a result of
organized documentation and others-such as Joseph Goebbels' diaries or
Hitler's Mein Kampf-comprise records of prominent figures in the Nazi
regime. Numerous Holocaust-related materials are still subject to
copyright protection. Yet, the impact of copyright law on the memory of
the Holocaust remains largely unexplored.
This article engages in the first systematic exploration of the copyright-
Holocaust interface and presents a twofold argument. First, we
demonstrate that copyright law plays a. heretofore-unnoticed role in
shaping the collective memory of the Holocaust. Second, on a normative
level, we argue that the prevalent narratives underlying copyright law, as
well as ordinary copyright doctrines, do not comfortably apply to
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Holocaust-related materials, and that this state of affairs yields socially
undesirable consequences. The latter include, inter alia, victims' works
created with the explicit goal of documenting the Holocaust that may
remain in the file-drawer due to copyright concerns, as well as ordinary
copyright protection applying to infamous Nazi materials, thus providing
their owners with certain influence over the Holocaust's narrative. By
closely examining various case studies, we analyze the principal tensions
between the copyright regime and the Holocaust and offer several
concrete recommendations concerning the application of copyright law to
Holocaust-related materials. On a more general note, our analysis sheds
new light on copyright's impact on collective and intergenerational
memory.
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Ten metal boxes and three milk cans were exposed beneath the ruins of
the Warsaw ghetto in the years 1946 and 1950. They contained thousands
of documents, known as the "Oyneg Shabes Archives."' The archives
were collected, created, and compiled in the ghetto during the Holocaust
by a group of Jewish intellectuals and scholars under the leadership of Dr.
Emanuel Ringelblum. 2 Their contents comprised a detailed documentation
of Jewish life under Nazi occupation, focusing on the Warsaw ghetto.3
Among the materials were scholarly studies, reflections on the situation of
the Jews, documents issued by the German authorities, real-time
periodization of the extermination of the Jewish population, photos,
memoirs, poems, personal letters, and myriad additional documents. 4 In
an effort to secure the archives from extermination, the team buried them
in the ground when the liquidation of the Warsaw ghetto and the
prospective extinction of its occupants became apparent.5 David Graber, a
nineteen-year-old teenager who assisted in the burial process described it
in a last-minute note:
What we were unable to cry and shriek out to the world we buried
in the ground . . . .1 would love to see the moment in which the
great treasure will be dug up and scream the truth at the world. So
the world may know all. So the ones who did not live through it
may be glad. And we may feel like veterans with medals on our
chests. We would be the fathers, the teachers, and educators for
the future . . . But no, we shall certainly not live to see it, and
therefore I write my last will. May the treasure fall into good
hands. May it last into better times. May it alarm and alert the
world to what happened . . . in the twentieth century . .. .May
history attest for us. 6
By 1945, most of the Jews of Europe were dead.7 Among them were
most members of the archives' group. A search initiated by a few of the
survivors after the War led to the exposure of two parts of the archives.
The third part has not been found to this day.8
1. Paul A. Shapiro, Eleonora Bergman & Feliks Tych, Foreword, in THE WARSAw GHETTO:
OYNEG SHABES - RINGELBLUM ARCHIVE, xi (Robert M. Shapiro & Tadeusz Epsztein eds., 2009).
2. SAMUEL D. KASSOW, WHO WILL WRITE OUR HISTORY? EMANUEL RINGELBLUM, THE
WARSAW GHETTO, AND THE OYNEG SHABES ARCHIVE (2007).
3. Shapiro et al., supra note 1; KASSOw, supra note 2.
4. For a systematic catalogue of the archive's contents, see Shapiro et al., supra note 1.
5. KASSow, supra note 2 at 3-5.
6. As translated and cited in KASSOW, supra note 2, at 3.
7. "About the Holocaust"-YAD VASHEM, THE WORLD HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE CENTER,
available at http://www.yadvashem.org/Holocaust/about.
8. KASSOW, supra note 2, at 2-5.
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In 1943, the opera "Kaiser von Atlantis" (the Emperor of Atlantis)
reached the rehearsal stage. Rehearsals took place in basement L-4 11 in
the Theresienstadt concentration camp.9 The opera--composed in
Theresienstadt by Viktor Ullmann, a well-known composer, to a libretto
by the young painter and poet Peter Kien--comprises one example of
what would later be described as a musical genre unique to the Holocaust:
music created in concentration and extermination camps.10 Through a
profound satire of Hitler and the Third Reich, the Kaiser von Atlantis
conveyed an authentic, genuine message about the incomprehensible
realities of the Holocaust: the inhuman repression, the mass suffering, and
the blurring of life and death." By early 1944, the Kaiser was ready for
performance. Both Ullmann and Kien were sent to Auschwitz and
murdered shortly thereafter, and the performance at Theresienstadt never
took place.1 2 Yet, before his deportation, Ullmann entrusted the score of
the opera and its libretto, typed on the backs of official prisoner
information sheets, to a fellow prisoner, who survived the Holocaust.
Several decades lapsed until the manuscripts eventually found their way
to the musical world. The premiere of the Kaiser von Atlantis finally took
place in Amsterdam in 1975, some thirty years after its completion. 13
The first part of Mein Kampf was published in Germany in 1925.14 The
book outlined its author's ideology and future plan for Germany, but was
not an instant success. For a few years, sales were in the range of several
thousand copies per year. However, they increased with the author's
political success.' 5 By 1933, the book sold over 800,000 copies, and in the
9. Michael Graubart, The Emperor of Atlantis: The First British Production, 150 THE MUSICAL
TIMES, 85 (2009).
10. See generally, Guido Fackler, Music in Concentration Camps 1933-1945, 1 Music &
POLITICS 1 (Peter Logan trans., 2007); Kara Wheeler, Melodies of a Nightmare: Music in the
Holocaust, 13 PERSP. 3 (2005) (discussing the various roles and types of music during the
Holocaust); Melanie M. Hutchings, A Comparative Analysis of the Musical Activities within Three
German Occupied Concentration Camps: Warsaw, Terezin, and Auschwitz (Aug. 5, 2012)
(unpublished M.A thesis, San Diego State University) available at http://sdsu-
dspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10211.10/2421/HutchingsMelanie.pdf;sequence=1;
Michal Bilstiger, Viktor Ullmann's Kaiser von Atlantis ("The Emperor of Atlantis"), MUZIKALIYA
VIIIJUDAICA 4, 1 (2012) ("to the history of music, the 20 ' century added a genre previously
unknown: the music of the concentration and extermination camps").
11. Graubart, supra note 9, at 86; Bilstiger, supra note 10, at pp. 3-5 (offering a detailed analysis
of the opera's contents and the "spiritual message sent by the opera's creators living in the extreme
situation of an historical cataclysm").
12. Bilstiger, supra note 10, at 5.
13. Graubart, supra note 9, at 85 (detailing the events leading to the survival of the manuscripts
and the performance of the opera).
14. OTHMAR PLOCKINGER, GESCHICHTE EINES BUCHEs: ADOLF HITLERS MEIN KAMPF: 1922-
1945 85 (2011); C. Caspar, 'Mein Kampf': A Best-Seller, 20 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES 3, 4 (1958). The
second part of the book was published in 1926.
15. Caspar, supra note 14, at 5.
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years that followed sales rose to millions of copies per year. 16 With
Hitler's rise to power, interest in the book outside of Germany also grew.
In the United States and in France, abridged versions were published
under a contract with the German publisher who obtained the rights from
Hitler.17 Yet, with the unfolding of events, it became clear that Mein
Kampf contains not just propaganda, but also the seeds of Hitler's actual
plans.18 Therefore, the publication of the entire manuscript "assumed a
more urgent character." 19 One full-but-edited version was authorized by
Hitler's German publisher for circulation in the United States, but a
second publisher who distributed an unauthorized full-text version was
forced to cease distribution following a copyright infringement claim by
the authorized publisher, Houghton Mifflin Co. 20 The court had affirmed
Hitler's copyright. The defendants' claim that "the equities [were] in their
favor" and that the publication of the entire manuscript comprised "a
service of great social value" was proclaimed "bold." 21 Another
unabridged version disseminated in France in 1934 was destroyed
following a copyright infringement lawsuit by Hitler's publishers. 22 The
French people had to make do with an authorized, edited translation, from
which the anti-French passages that appeared in the original book were
omitted. 23
The Oyneg Shabes archives, like the Kaiser von Atlantis opera on the
one hand and Mein Kampf on the other, are but a few examples of
Holocaust-related works. 24 The duration and scope of the Holocaust, its
16. Id. at 5-6.
17. Id.
18. Id., at 9-10. Sarah Smith, The Kampf about Mein Kampf 19 B.U.L. REv. 633, 633-34 (1939)
("[Hitler's] plans were all formulated and narrated therein, and he was following them closely."). For
one illustration, see the following passage:
If, at the beginning of the War, or even during the War, if twelve or fifteen thousand of these
Hebraic corrupters of the nation had been subjected to poison gas, . . . then the sacrifice of
millions in the front would not have been in vain. On the contrary. . .
MEIN KAMPF BY ADOLF HITLER, COMPLETE, UNABRIDGED, ANNOTATED BY NEWTON STEIN, 984
(1939).
19. John Chamberlain et al., Publishers' Note to MEIN KAMPF BY ADOLF HITLER, COMPLETE,
UNABRIDGED, ANNOTATED BY NEWTON STEIN (1939).
20. Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 104 F.2d 306 (2 Cir., 1939). See also Caspar,
supra note 15, at 10.
21. Houghton Mifflin Co., 104 F2d. at 312. For an analysis of the legal questions discussed in
court, particularly the question of Hitler's copyright as a "stateless person," see Note, "Mein Kampf'
and the Protection of Literary Property of Stateless Persons 49 YALE L.J. 132 (1939). The
distribution of a second, unauthorized and abridged version of the book which was disseminated in
the United States during the same period was also enjoined following a copyright infringement claim
by the authorized publishers-Houton Mifflin Co. v. Noram Pub. Co., 28 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
22. Smith, supra note 18, at 634; Caspar, supra note 15, at 13.
23. Caspar, supra note 15, at 13.
24. We use the term 'Holocaust-related works" or "Holocaust-related materials" throughout this
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occurrence in the midst of the twentieth century with photography and
film technologies already available, and its setting at the heart of Europe,
yielded countless documents, diaries, notes, memoirs, photographs, films,
music, poems, letters, and additional artifacts.25 On the Nazi side, these
items include propaganda materials, such as the film Triumph of the
Will26; materials produced as part of the organized documentation carried
out by the Nazi regime; and monographs and diaries of prominent Nazi
figures such as Hitler, Himmler, and Goebbels. 27 On the victims' part,
these materials comprise various documents, photos, drawings, music
sheets, poems, and diaries, many of which were produced as purposeful
acts of social remembering and cultural preservation for future
generations. Examples of such works include Kaiser von Atlantis, Mendel
Grossman's photos from the Lodz ghetto,28 Anne Frank's diary, 29 and the
secret archives of the Kovno Jewish Ghetto Police.30 Whether created by
victims or by perpetrators, these authentic real-time materials give us a
glimpse into an event whose magnitude and extremity are difficult to
article to refer primarily to two types of materials: (1) works produced by Holocaust victims during
the Holocaust; and (2) works produced by the Nazi regime and its collaborators either during the
Holocaust or in proximity thereto. Thus, works such as Mein Kampf or the film Triumph of the Will
that were created during the rise to power of the Nazi regime (but before the Holocaust) are included
among the Holocaust-related materials discussed in this article.
2 For the magnitude of Holocaust-related materials, see, e.g., Karen C. Coe, United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, THE INTERNET, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, MARCH 13, 2008, SERIAL No. 110-131
"PROMOTING THE USE OF ORPHAN WORK: BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS AND
USERS," available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-hearing-3-10-2008.pdf (hereafter:
"Testimony of Holocaust Memorial Museum") (indicating that "the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum has acquired and currently maintains 42 millions pages of archival documents,
77,000 photographs, and 985 hours of historical film footage"). See also YAD VASHEM, THE WORLD
HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE CENTER, available at
http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/he/about/documentation.asp (reporting that the Yad Vashem archives
contain 125 million pages of Holocaust documents and 420,000 photographs).
26. For a detailed description of the film, see May Devereaux, Beauty and Evil: The case ofLeni
Riefenstahl'S Triumph of the Will, in JERROLD LEVINSON, ED., AESTHETICS AND ETHICS: ESSAYS AT
THE INTERSECTION, 227 (1998), and the discussion in Part I, infra.
27. See, e.g., Ed Mazza, Nazi Heinrich Himmler's Lost Diaries Show How He Mixed Family
With Mass Murder, THE HUFFINGTON POST (August 3 2016), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/heinrich-himmler-diaries us_57ala09de4b0e2el5eb7db40;
Dalya Alberge, Joseph Goebbels' Family Win Legal Battle to be Paid Royalties for Diary Extracts,
THE QUARDIAN (Jul. 9, 2015) available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/09/joseph-
goebbels-family-royalties-diaries-nazi-propaganda-minister. For the recent legal proceedings
concerning Goebbels diaries, see infra, notes 137-137 and the accompanying text.
28. For the story of the Grossman photo archive, see Part II infra, notes 117-118 and the
accompanying text.
29. See Foreword, ANNE FRANKE, A DIARY OF A YOUNG GIRL: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION, at 2
(ED. OTTO H. FRANK AND MIRTAM PRESSLET, TRANS. SUSAN MASSOTTI, 1995). For a discussion of
Anne Frank's diary, see Part II infra.
30. THE CLANDESTINE HISTORY OF THE KOVNO JEWISH GHETTO POLICE 63 (ANONYMOUS
MEMBERS OF THE KovNo JEWISH GHETTO POLICE, TRANS. & ED. SAMUEL SCHALKOWSKY, WITH AN
INTRODUCTION BY SAMUEL D. KASSOw (2014) (hereinafter: "THE CLANDESTINE HISTORY"). For the
story of the archive, see Part II infra.
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express post factum.31 As the number of live witnesses decreases, the
significance of these materials increases.
Concomitantly, many of these materials are (or were until very
recently) subject to copyright-a private law, market-based mechanism
that allocates proprietary rights to the creators of literary, dramatic,
musical, and artistic works. 32 The interface between copyright law and the
Holocaust raises acute questions concerning both copyright law and the
collective memory of the Holocaust. For example, should copyright serve
as a vehicle for limiting access to the full text of Mein Kampf? Should
Nazi propaganda materials award their creators with a stamp of
authorship and entitle them to royalties, just like any ordinary copyrighted
work? And how should copyright law treat works like the Kaiser von
Atlantis or the Oyneg Shabes Archives-works whose creation was
motivated not by monetary considerations but by the urgent need to leave
a memory to future generations? Works whose 'chain of distribution'
involved inevitable burial and concealment? It is this interface of
copyright and the Holocaust that we explore in this article.
Our argument is two-fold. First, we aim to illuminate the heretofore
unexplored impact of copyright law on the collective memory and
historical narratives of the Holocaust. Simply put, collective memory and
historical narratives rely, to a large extent, on public access to authentic
materials.33 Therefore, and given that numerous Holocaust-related
materials were or still are subject to copyright protection, the copyright
regime has affected and still affects the collective memory of the
Holocaust in nuanced, indirect manners, by limiting the availability of
these materials to the public, which in turn hinders the dissemination of
knowledge about, and remembrance of the Holocaust. We seek to begin
unraveling this impact, focusing specifically on the influence of copyright
law on museums, archives, and additional Holocaust remembrance-
institutions.
Second, and relatedly, we highlight significant tensions at the interface
of copyright law and the Holocaust. Copyright's principal paradigm of
inducing the creation of cultural products by allocating private proprietary
rights to their creators is largely irrelevant with respect to numerous
Holocaust-related materials. Furthermore, copyright law's standard
doctrinal toolbox does not envision extreme circumstances of genocide
and cultural extinction. Therefore, the 'ordinary' application of copyright
31. For a discussion of this point, see Part I, infra, notes 62-66 and the accompanying text.
32. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (detailing the various subject matter of copyright
protection). For copyright's duration and its subsistence in various Holocaust-related materials, see
infra, notes 35-39 and the accompanying text.
33. See the discussion in Part I infra.
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law to Holocaust-related materials raises a series of theoretical and
doctrinal challenges and can yield socially undesirable outcomes. To
illustrate, heirs and successors of the Nazi regime exercise their copyright
in prominent Nazi materials to generate royalties, thereby potentially
impacting the Holocaust's narrative. On the other end of the spectrum,
institutions dedicated to the commemoration of the Holocaust may be
hesitant to publish victims' works created during the genocide, due to
copyright constraints. By closely examining various case studies, we
identify, classify, and analyze the principal points of friction between the
copyright regime and the Holocaust. Some of these tensions are unique to
the Holocaust, others subsist in additional circumstances but are brought
to the extreme given the radical circumstances of the Holocaust. We
further present several normative recommendations that would alleviate
or at least mitigate these conflicts.
Whereas copyright aspects of several specific Holocaust-related
materials have received limited scholarly attention and media coverage,3 4
the interface of copyright and the Holocaust, as such, has not been the
subject of a systematic and critical scholarly analysis. Through this
article, we take the first steps toward filling in this gap. Our analysis
demonstrates that a systematic exploration of the relationship between
copyright and the Holocaust brings to the fore unique aspects common to
various Holocaust-related materials, enables identification of the principal
tensions between copyright and the Holocaust, and allows to devise initial
solutions.
Before commencing our exploration, a preliminary question must be
addressed: is the inquiry initiated herein still relevant given that more than
34. For existing scholarly discussions, see, prominently, Note, supra note 21; Smith, supra note
18 (published in 1939, these two articles discussing the U.S. court decisions concerning Mein Kampj);
Jessica M. Silbey, Evidence Veritd and the Law ofFilm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1257 (2010) (discussing
the film Triumph of the Will as a form of artistic political expression); Aaron Schwabach, Reclaiming
Copyright From the Outside In: What the Downfall Hitler Meme Means for Transformative Works,
Fair Use, and Parody 8 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 1 (2012) (discussing contemporary video parodies
depicting Hitler, based on segments from the film "Downfall"); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Protecting
Anne Frank's Voice-Even 7 Decades Later, (Jan. 2, 2016), available at
http://forward.com/opinion/328250/protecting-anne-franks-voice-even-7-decades-later/ (discussing
the application of a moral rights regime to protect Anne Frank's authentic 'voice' from unauthorized
alterations); ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY, 100-101 (2010) (discussing
the question of moral rights in portraits painted by a Holocaust victim at the direction of Joseph
Mengele); Hubert Best, The Spoils of War, BIRD & BIRD, (Jan. 7, 2002) available at
http://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2002/germanfilmsandukenemypropertyactl 9 5 3ptl
(discussing the effect of the U.K. Enemy Property Act 1953 on copyright subsisting in Nazi
propaganda films); Clemens Bogedain, 'Mein Kampf', der 'Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts" und die
'Goebbels-Tagebticher': Werke fritherer NS-Grap3en im Spannungsfeld von Strafrecht, Urheberrecht
und kiinftiger Gemeinfreihei ZUM 205 (2015) (discussing copyright and criminal aspects of works of
prominent Nazi figures); Martin Husovec, A Copyright Story of an Infamous Book, Husco's TECH.
LAW BLOG, (October 3, 2016), available at http://www.husovec.eu/2016/03/a-copyright-story-of-
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seventy years have lapsed since the end of World War II, and copyright
protection commonly expires seventy years after the author's death?3 5 A
close look reveals that the answer is positive. Numerous Holocaust-
related materials are still subject to copyright protection, and will remain
so for the next decades. Nazi propaganda and documentation materials
generally remain under copyright, since many of their creators survived
the War. For example, copyright in the writings of Otto Skorzeny, head of
the German Commandos during the War, will likely subsist until 2045,36
while copyright in Triumph of the Will in certain jurisdictions may not
expire before 2030.37 On the victims' side, there is a massive number of
works produced during the Holocaust whose authors' identities and fates
are unknown. 38 In the case of such anonymous works, copyright in the
United States endures for ninety-five years from the year of first
publication of the work (which often occurred years after the War), or for
a hundred-and-twenty years from the year of the work's creation. 9 In
other instances, works of victims whose identities are known were often
first published many years after the end of the War. In such cases,
according to a complex web of provisions in copyright legislation, the
works may be protected for ninety-five years from the year of their first
publication, or (in some instances) until 2047.40 Therefore, copyright still
subsists in myriad Holocaust-related materials. In addition, as we
elaborate below, even where copyright protection in certain materials has
expired, its subsistence until very recently has likely shaped social
memory. Altogether, then, our inquiry is by no means "a thing of the
past."
Finally, our analysis concentrates primarily on U.S. copyright law, with
occasional references to European, mostly German, copyright law. One
should note, however, that various (European and other) copyright
regimes may potentially apply to some of the Holocaust-related materials
we discuss, particularly when such materials are digitized and accessible
online. A thorough review of the treatment of Holocaust-related materials
35. See § 302-303 of the U.S. Copyright Act (1976).
36. Based on the manuscript's publication in 1950, as well as Skorzeny's passing in 1975-
Charles Messenger, Foreward, in OTTO SKORZENY, SKORZENY'S SPECIAL MISSIONS, xi (1957)
(noting that Skorzeny "died peacefully in his bed . .. in 1975").
37. The film was first published in Europe in 1935. Therefore copyright protection seemingly
subsists for 95 years-see §§ 303-304 of the U.S. Copyright Act. However, it is not entirely clear
whether copyright in the film was automatically restored under the provisions of § 104A of the
Copyright Act, or conversely, whether the film was excluded from restoration under the exception set
out in § 104A(a)(2) of the Act. For elaboration on the copyright questions surrounding Triumph of the
Will, and the question of copyright restoration in Nazi works, see Part II infra, notes 122-146 and the
accompanying text.
38. See the discussion of orphan works in Part II.D, infra.
39. See, e.g., § 304 of the U.S. Copyright Act.
40. See §§ 303(a)-304 of the U.S. Copyright Act.
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under different copyright jurisdictions and the interactions between these
various regimes exceeds the scope of this article. 41 Yet, the possible
applicability of various copyright regimes likely increases the overall
impact of copyright over the Holocaust's collective memory.
Our discussion proceeds as follows: Part I locates our study within the
landscape of copyright law and Holocaust collective memory. We begin
by providing necessary background on the concept of collective memory,
and the influence of copyright on social remembrance practices and
collective memory. We then proceed to focus specifically on the relations
between copyright law and the construction of the Holocaust memory.
Part II 'zooms-in' to critically analyze the interface of the Holocaust and
copyright doctrine. Relying on various examples and case studies, we
map and analyze the principal dilemmas and tensions that arise when
applying the ordinary 'algorithm' of copyright law to Holocaust-related
materials.42 This investigation further illuminates socially undesirable
implications of the current legal regime. Against this analysis, Part III
proceeds to advance several normative recommendations designed to
alleviate these difficulties and calibrate the application of copyright law to
Holocaust-related materials in a manner responsive to the exceptional
circumstances surrounding these materials. We conclude with several
particular lessons that may. be learnt from the exploration of the
copyright-Holocaust interface, and with some broader questions
concerning copyright and social memory, which our exploration
illuminates.
I. COLLECTIVE MEMORY, COPYRIGHT, AND THE HOLOCAUST
The concept of collective memory, developed by leading sociologists,
refers to the joint recollection of the past by a nation, a community, or
additional groups with elements of a joint identity. 43 The underlying
assumption is that peoples' memories are shaped not just through their
own individual experiences but also through social processes and
41. The matter is complex, involves questions ofjurisdiction and international law, and certainly
deserves further exploration. To illustrate, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Art. 3) sets out a principle of "national treatment, under which works whose authors
are nationals of a State which is a party to the convention, or works first published in such a State,
must be given protection in each of the other member States, as the latter grant to the works of their
own nationals. Moreover, given the online storage of numerous copyrighted works, certain uses of
works that are copyright protected under a European regime, especially in digital context, may trigger
liability under the foreign law, even if such actions are carried out by a U.S. user.
42. We should perhaps clarify that we use the term "copyright algorithm" in this article
metaphorically, to refer to the entire body of copyright law, theory and doctrine, and the ways in
which it is applied, and not to any software algorithm.
43. The origins of the study of collective memory as a social construct are attributed to Maurice
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discursive engagements. 44 These processes involve the accumulation of
individual memories into integrated narratives about the past.45 Elements
of collective memory thus comprise the shared knowledge, experiences,
and imageries of individuals about their joint past.46 They are entangled in
various dimensions of life and influence the formation of self-identity,
ideological and political acts, and cultural meaning-making processes.47
They travel across generations and affect both the group's internal social
relations and its relations with other nations and communities. 48
Collective memory, therefore, is. imminent for narrating and reflecting the
life-stories of nations and communities 49 and for shaping collective
identities."
Among the historical events whose impact on collective memory is well
recognized, the Holocaust is perhaps the most influential. As the largest
event of genocide and mass atrocity, the Holocaust captures a unique
place in the collective memory of numerous nations and communities
worldwide.51 Ample research has documented its impact on the collective
memories of the State of Israel,52 post-War Germany,53 Jewish
communities in the United States and elsewhere, 54 as well as on the
memory of various additional states and communities.55
44. See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Olick; Joyce Robbins, Social Memory Studies: From "Collective
Memory" to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices, 24 ANNUAL REv..Soc. 105, 106
(1998); Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi & Daniel Levy, Introduction, in THE COLLECTIVE
MEMORY READER 8-29 (2011); Jeffrey K. Olick, Collective Memory: The Two Cultures, 17 Soc.
THEORY 333, 334-335 (1999).
45. Olick, Collective Memory: The Two Cultures, supra note 44, at 342; Eviatar Zerubavel,
Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past, 19 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY 293, 290 (1996).
46. Id.
47. Barbie Zelizer, Reading the Past Against the Grain: The Shape of Memory Studies, 12
CRITICAL STUDIES IN MASS COMMUNICATION 214, 226-228 (1995); Jan Assmann, Collective
Memory and Cultural Identity, 65 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 125, 126 (1995).
48. Ross Poole, Memory, History and the Claims of the Past, 1(2) MEMORY STUDIES, 149
(2008); Olick, Collective Memory: The Two Cultures, supra note 44.
49. YAEL ZERUBAVEL, RECOVERED ROOTS: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE MAKING OF ISRAELI
NATIONAL TRADITION 11 (1995).
50. Zelizer, supra note 47; Assmann, supra note 47.
51. See, generally, Saul Friedlander, Introduction, in SAUL FRIEDLANDER, ED., PROBING THE
LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION: NAZISM AND THE "FINAL SOLUTION" 1-21 (1992); PETER NOVICK, THE
HOLOCAUST AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1999).
52. See, e.g., ToM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST (HAIM
WATZMAN TRANSL., 1993).
53. See, e.g., BILL NIVEN & CHLOE PAVER, MEMORIALIZATION IN GERMANY SINCE 1945 (2010).
54. See, e.g., Anita Shapira, The Holocaust: Private Memories, Public Memory, 4 JEWISH SOC.
STUD. 40 (1998); ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE MYTH OF THE CULTURAL JEW (2015); JAMES E.
YOUNG, THE TEXTURE OF MEMORY: HOLOCAUST MEMORIALS AND MEANING (1993).
55. See, e.g., Sheng Mei Ma, Contrasting Two Survival Literatures: On the Jewish Holocaust
and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 2 HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE STUDIES, 81, 81 (1987)
(observing that "indeed, 'Holocaust' has become so universal a reference point that even
contemporary Chinese writers, who live thousands of miles from the place of Nazi brutality and
possess only scanty knowledge of the details of the Holocaust, came to call their horrendous
experiences during the Cultural Revolution 'the ten-year Holocaust.' Yet the Cultural Revolution was
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As "an event at the limits," the Holocaust's extremity and radicalness
generate a range of interactions with collective memory.5 6 The following
discussion concentrates on those aspects that are particularly relevant for
clarifying the connection between the Holocaust's collective memory and
copyright law.
Collective memory, in general, is based on artifacts, documents, rituals,
and additional elements that affect meaning-making processes. Among
these elements, expressive works and authentic documentary materials are
often fundamental to the formation of the narratives that constitute
elements of collective memory.57 For example, scholars observe that the
direct, authentic documentation of the My Lai massacre and the Kennedy
assassination through audio-visual means conveys a sense of historical
truth that is absent from indirect, ex post, verbal description.58 Similarly,
the use of original, authentic, documents from constitutive events
increases the effectiveness of discursive engagements. 59
These observations are particularly critical with respect to the
Holocaust due to what has become known as the "problem of
representation": 60 The magnitude of the genocide, its "blatant criminality,
its coordinated exploitation of all modem resources, cultural and
technological," make it extremely difficult to perceive the Holocaust as a
reality.61 The scope and attributes of the tragedy "do not let the
imagination take off' and the moral crisis cannot be fully conveyed by
means of conventional storytelling.62 The famous metaphor of "the other
very different from the Holocaust and to use the same term for both is to distort these different
historical events and to dilute the term 'Holocaust' to the point of meaninglessness").
56. The phrase "an event at the limits" was coined by Friedlander, supra note 51 at 2-3 ("... we
are dealing with ... 'an event at the limits' ... the most radical form of genocide encountered in
history").
57. See, generally, JACQUES LE GOFF, HISTORY AND MEMORY (1992); John Urry, How Societies
Remember the Past, in THEORIZING MUSEUMS, 46, 63 (SHARON MACDONALD & GORDON FYFE
EDITORS, 1996); MoTI NEIGER, OREN MEYERS & EYAL ZANDBERG, ONE MEDIA MEMORY:
COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN A NEW MEDIA AGE (2011); MARSHALL MCLUHAN & ERIC MCLUHAN,
LAWS OF MEDIA-THE NEW SCIENCE, 13-91 (1988); HERBERT ALTSCHULL, FROM MILTON TO
MCLUHAN-THE IDEAS BEHIND AMERICAN JOURNALISM, 337-348 (1990).
58. See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press? 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1186-1204 (1970) (using the examples of the My Lai
massacre and the Kennedy assassination as instances regarding which direct, authentic documentation
is necessary to convey the meaning and ramifications of the event).
59. See Neil. W. Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L.
REV., 1, 14-15 (2001) (arguing that quoting verbatim from literary texts and works significantly
enhances the effectiveness of communicating the meaning, significance, and implications of the
quoted text).
60. Friedlander, supra note 56, at 3. (explaining that the Holocaust "tests our traditional
conceptual and representational categories").
61. Geoffrey H. Hartman, Introduction: Darkness Visible, IN GEOFFREY H. HARTMAN, ED.,
HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE: THE SHAPES OF MEMORY, 1, 4,6 (1994).
62. See Oren Meyers, Eyal Zandberg & Moti Neiger, Prime Time Commemoration: An Analysis
of Television Broadcasts on Israel's Memorial Day for the Holocaust and the Heroism 59 J. OF
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planet" illustrates this difficulty. The image is based on the testimony of
writer and Holocaust survivor Yehiel Dinur (Ka-Tzetnik), during the
Eichmann trial, where he used it to describe his experiences at Auschwitz:
Time there is not like it is here on earth . . . The inhabitants of this
planet had no names, they had no parents nor did they have
children . . . They breathed according to different laws of nature,
they did not live-nor did they die-according to the laws of this
world. . .63
In light of the problem of representation, scholarship emphasizes that
understanding and absorbing the Holocaust necessitates exposure to
diverse materials that unravel the numerous dimensions of life on "the
other planet"-materials that reflect the atrocities of the Nazi regime, the
victims' struggle, and the stories of those who did not survive. Such
materials include not only the direct representations of the genocide, but
also piecemeal documentation of small segments of life during the
Holocaust on the one hand, and of the various aspects of the Nazi
machinery on the other.64 Overall, then, the perception of the Holocaust's
historical narrative and its moral ramifications, as well as the endurance
of its collective memory, depend upon the ability to access and use
myriad authentic materials such as letters, notes, lists, diaries, memoirs,
archives, film footage, drawings, and photographs, created throughout the
events either by the victims or by the Nazi perpetrators. 65 As we further
demonstrate in the next Part, not only were such materials ubiquitously
produced, but many of them were created by victims with the explicit goal
of providing future generations with authentic records of their personal
experiences in the face of imminent extermination and cultural
extinction.66
Scholarship also recognizes that the law plays a part in constructing
historical narratives and collective memory-both in general and with
respect to the Holocaust in particular.67 One prominent example is the role
of judicial or quasi-judicial institutions as agents of collective memory,
particularly in times of post-trauma. For example, the Nuremberg trials
and the Eichmann trial, which took place after World War II, brought the
COMM. 456, 459 (2009); cf Hartman, supra note 61, at 2 ("the imagination has little occasion to
leap").
63. See Criminal Case 40/61 The Attorney General of the State of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann,
Record of Proceedings in the District Court in Jerusalem, Session 68, Part 1, June 7 1961, available
via "NIZKOR PROJECT", http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-
adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-068-01.html.
64. Meyers et al., supra note 62.
65. See Introduction supra, notes 25-30 and the accompanying text.
66. See the discussion in Part II infra, notes 107-121 and the accompanying text;
67. See, generally, Joachim J. Savelsberg & Ryan D. King, Law & Collective Memory, 3 ANN.
REv. L. & Soc. SCI. 189 (2007).
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historical narrative of the Holocaust to the fore and played a significant
role in constructing its history and memory. 68 Additional, more nuanced
examples of law's impact concern legal norms that regulate access to and
dissemination of information. Illustrative of this type of influence are libel
laws, or laws prohibiting Holocaust denial, which regulate "what can be
said about the past." 69
This latter observation concerning the indirect impact of different laws
on the narratives of the Holocaust prompts us to explore the significant-
yet largely unnoticed-role of copyright law in constructing the
Holocaust's memory. Copyright is a legal regime that grants proprietary
rights in expressive and cultural works, including literary, musical, and
artistic works, as well as photographs and audio-visual works. 70 By
controlling the access to and the utilization of such materials, copyright
law governs their use as part of collective memory processes, and, similar
to other laws, imposes certain regulation on "what can be said about the
past", and on which conditions. Since myriad Holocaust-related materials
are still under copyright protection, and will remain so through the next
decades," copyright can substantially affect the construction of the
Holocaust's historical narratives and collective memory. Indeed, this
effect is not merely. abstract. As we demonstrate throughout this article,
copyright is very much present in the sphere of Holocaust-related
materials.72 Thus, for example, Nazi propaganda materials and
monographs of prominent Nazi figures are declared copyright-protected
works.73 This status entitles their authors or their heirs to royalties and
may impose significant constraints on Holocaust research. 74
68.. See, e.g., MARTHA L. MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); Savelsberg & King, supra note 67, at 192-193;
Renana Keidar, Rethinking Plurality: On Ethics and Storytelling in the Search for Justice 1 DIBUR, 19
(2015); HANNA YABLONKA, THE STATE OF ISRAEL VS. ADOLF EICHMANN (2004); ANNETTE
wIEVIORKA, THE ERA OF THE WITNESS (TRANS. JARED STARK, 2006).
69. Savelsberg & King, supra note 67, at 197-199; Leora Bilsky & Hemda Gur-Aryeh, The
Judenrat as Collaborator: Libel Law in the Service of Memory, 12 MISHPAT U-MIMSHAL, 33 (2009)
(in Hebrew). An additional example concerns a controversial bill recently approved by the Polish
Parliament, which prohibits assertions that ". . . the Polish Nation or the Republic of Poland is
responsible or co-responsible for Nazi crimes committed by the Third Reich " .-see "Full Text of
Poland's Controversial Holocaust Legislation", THE TIMES OF ISRAEL, February 1st. 2018, available
at https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-polands-controversial-holocaust-legislation/.
70. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2)
musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying
music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6)
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.").
71. Supra, notes 35-39 and the accompanying text.
72. Part II infra.
73. See the discussion in Part II infra, notes 130-137 and the accompanying text.
74. Matthew Reisz, Royalties for Nazi Writing, TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION (Apr. 30, 2015)
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Remembrance institutions dedicated to the commemoration of the
Holocaust are constrained in their ability to use masses of authentic works
created by anonymous victims;" and significant royalties are charged for
the use of archival footage documenting the genocide. 6
Existing copyright scholarship has highlighted copyright's potential
influence on historical narratives and public discourse. However, none
of these discussions focuses on the memory of the Holocaust. Moreover,
extant scholarship tends to concentrate on the constraints which copyright
imposes on contemporary discourse, thus framing the topic as a conflict
between copyright and free speech.7 1 Yet the case of Holocaust-related
materials clearly demonstrates that copyright's impact is not confined to
current discourses and expressive activities. Rather, it extends to the
formation of collective memory and to future generations. 79
Several factors expand copyright's grasp and enhance its impact on the
Holocaust's collective memory. The first concerns a unique combination
of properties that characterize Holocaust-related materials and hinder
access thereto under existing copyright doctrine. Briefly, Holocaust-
related materials authored by victims are often unpublished, a fact which
constrains the applicability of statutory exceptions designed to limit the
control of copyright.80 Similarly, while the Holocaust's problem of
representation makes access to authentic materials especially vital," the
existing "copyright algorithm" is not designed to facilitate access to
entire, authentic works (as opposed to partial paraphrases). 82 In addition,
the Holocaust yielded enormous amounts of 'orphan works,' namely
"copyrighted works whose owners are difficult or even impossible to
locate."8 3 The need to obtain copyright clearance in order to use these
available at https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/04/30/scholars-are-troubled-legal-battle-
over-goebbels%E2%80%99s-diaries (interviewing various historians who observe that recent
enforcement of copyright in materials composed by Nazi officials are likely to produce a substantial
chilling effect on Holocaust research).
75. See the discussion in Part II.D infra.
76. See the discussion in Part II infra, notes 138-139 and the accompanying text.
77. For discussions of copyright's impact on historically significant materials, see, for example,
P. King, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L. J., 1565, 1571, 1573 (1984);
SIGMUND TIMBERG, NEW FoRMs OF MEDIA AND THE CHALLENGE TO COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE AND
FREE INQUIRY, 248, 253-255 (J.S. LAWRENCE & B. TIMBERG EDS., 1980); Nimmer, supra note 58;
Netanel, supra note 59.
78. Id.
79. Cf Sonia Kaytal, Technoheritage, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1111 (2017) (exploring the significance
of copyright protection for cultural heritage in the context of museums).
80. See the discussion in Part I.B, infra.
81. Supra, notes 61-66 and the accompanying text.
82. See the discussion in Part II.C, infra.
83. See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 1, 22 (Jan. 2006) available at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf (explaining that the most common obstacles to
locating a copyright owner are "(1) inadequate identifying information on a particular copy of the
work; (2) inadequate information about copyright ownership because of a change of ownership or a
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works constitutes a serious impediment that may jeopardize such use.8 4
We discuss these attributes in detail in the following Part, against a close
scrutiny of copyright doctrine.85 The important point at this stage is that
each of these characteristics, and the combination thereof, casts doubt
over the possibility of making Holocaust-related materials available to the
public, and, in turn, increases copyright's influence on the Holocaust's
narratives and memory.
Second, and relatedly, copyright's impact is intensified in light of the
fundamental role of remembrance institutions in the formation of the
Holocaust's memory and their sensitivity to copyright constraints.
Remembrance institutions are entities such as archives, libraries, and
museums, which select, document, preserve and provide access to
documents, artifacts, and additional materials.86 Numerous remembrance
institutions were established after the Holocaust in Israel, the United
States, Europe, and elsewhere, with the explicit mission of
commemorating the Holocaust for current and future generations. 87 A
primary aim of these institutions is to preserve Holocaust-related
materials and make them available to the public through archives, public
exhibitions, and digital collections.88 Notably, numerous Holocaust-
related materials likely do not have sufficient market demand to be
distributed through regular market channels. This is particularly true with
respect to the abundant piecemeal letters, notes, photos, illustrations, and
additional artifacts, which cannot compete in the art market, yet together
comprise a bricolage that conveys the realities of the Holocaust.89 As a
practical matter, Holocaust remembrance institutions are often the only
way to preserve these works and expose them to the public.
A broad range of scholarship acknowledges that remembrance
change in the circumstances of the owner; (3) limitations of existing copyright ownership information
sources; and (4) difficulties researching copyright information").
84. See the discussion in Part IID, infra.
85. Infra, Part II.
86. See Guy Pessach, [Networked] Memory Institutions Social Remembering: Privatization and
its Discontents, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 71, 73 (2008).
87. See, e.g., YAD VASHEM -THE WORLD HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE CENTER-"Mission
Statement", http://www.yadvashem.org/about/mission-statement; THE UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL MUSEUM - "Mission and History", https://www.ushmm.org/information/about-the-
museum/mission-and-history.
88. See, e.g., "The Holocaust Survivors and Victims Resource Center" and the "World Memory
Project", at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (https://www.ushmm.org/remember/the-
holocaust-survivors-and-victims-resource-center; https://www.ushmm.org/online/world-memory-
project/); The archives and collections of Yad Vashem, The World Holocaust Remembrance Center at
http://www.yadvashem.org/archive/aboutlour-collections.
89. See Testimony of Holocaust Memorial Museum, supra note 25, at 66 ("while the Museum's
works have considerable historical and cultural value, they are rarely works of intrinsic artistic value
such that they could compete in a fine art market"). For further discussion of this point, see Part II.D
infra, note 216 and accompanying text.
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institutions are generally susceptible to copyright law's constraints, since
many of their activities-including copying, reproduction, and
distribution of archival copyrighted materials-are governed by the
proprietary regime of copyright law.90 This impact of copyright has
intensified in the age of 'mass digitization', namely digitization projects
that involve a massive number of copyrighted works, converted into a
digital format. 91 While digitization and the Internet provide remembrance
institutions with promising capacities for the preservation, distribution,
and display of materials, copyright law generally governs such activities.
Therefore, mass digitization enhances copyright's centrality in the
operations of remembrance institutions, and, in turn, expands these
institutions' dependence on copyright owners. 92 Moreover, absent an
applicable copyright exception, mass digitization requires that
remembrance institutions engage in a case-by-case copyright clearance of
the entire contents of their collections-a costly and often impractical task
that becomes even more complicated when orphan works constitute a
substantial portion of the collection.93
In principle, copyright law aspires to deal with some of these obstacles
through exemption schemes embedded in copyright doctrine. Chief
among these schemes is fair use-a statutory doctrine that permits certain
uses of copyrighted material without the owners' consent, and constitutes
the principal limitation to the exclusive rights of copyright owners.94
However, ample literature suggests that the extant schemes provide only
partial and limited solutions for the activities of remembrance
institutions.95
90. See, generally, Pessach, supra note 86; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Can Our Culture Be
Saved? The Future of Digital Archiving, 91 MINN. L. REv. 989 (2007); Emily Hudson & Andrew
T. Kenyon, Without Walls: Copyright Law and Digital Collections in Australian Cultural
Institutions 42 SCRIPTED 197 (2007) doi:10.2966/scrip.040207.x; Emily Hudson & Andrew
T. Kenyon, Digital Access: The Impact Of Copyright On Digitisation Practices In Australian
Museums, Galleries, Libraries, and Archives 31 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 12 (2007).
91. See Maria A. Pallante, Orphan Works and Mass Digitization: Obstacles and Opportunities,
27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1251 (2012); MARIA F. PALLANTE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS
DIGITIZATION: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT (June, 2015) (hereinafter "ORPHAN
WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION REPORT"), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan-
works2015.pdf, at pp. 72-73.
92. Id.
93. See the discussion in Part IID, infra. See also Anna Vuopala, Assessment of the Orphan
Works Issue and Costs for Rights Clearance, European Commission, DG INFSO (Feb. 2010),
http://cultivate-cier.nl/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/vuopala-report.pdf (providing data from actual
digitization projects that illustrate the scope of the problem of orphan works and its impact on the
time and effort that rights clearance requires in different sectors of cultural institutions).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 107. For a detailed discussion, see Part II.B & C, infra.
95. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 90, at 1020-1026 (explaining that the application of the fair
use doctrine to large scale reproductions of entire copyrighted works for digital preservation projects
is questionable at best, particularly when such projects aim to make the materials accessible to the
public), and the discussion in Part I.D, infra.
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We discuss these schemes in detail in the next Part and demonstrate that
the solutions they offer are even more partial and far from satisfactory
with regard to Holocaust-related materials, given their unique attributes.
The point we wish to make at this stage, however, is that the questionable
application of copyright exceptions to the activities of Holocaust
remembrance institutions combined with the significance of these
institutions in commemorating the Holocaust, may yield an undesirable
chilling effect. As copyright scholars recently observed, the uncertainties
of copyright doctrine make it extremely difficult to predict the prospects
of a fair-use argument ex ante.96 These uncertainties, together with the
anticipated costs of a copyright infringement suit, may deter those who
seek to use copyrighted materials from relying on the exceptions to
copyright protection in the first place. Instead, risk aversion directs users
to seek licenses, or to completely refrain from using certain materials-
even when their use may well be permitted under the fair use doctrine or
another copyright exception scheme, or when the subject matter is likely
free of copyright protection. 97
Since Holocaust remembrance institutions are commonly not-for-profit
entities, their copyright policies are likely to reflect such risk aversion,
and in turn to prevent them from making certain Holocaust-related
materials available to the public. 98 The testimony of the U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Museum before the U.S. Congress, in a hearing concerning
orphan works, clearly demonstrates that this concern is not merely
theoretical:
The museum is, therefore, the custodian of a significant number of
works that will not be made available to the public unless the
museum assumes the risk of a copyright infringer. And even
though these risks may be minimal, they are not ones that we can
responsibly assume and they, thus, have a chilling effect on all our
decisions regarding the use of orphan works. 99
96. See, e.g., Jennifer Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property. 93
vIRGINIA L. REv. 1899, 1910-11 (2007); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in
Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007); Michal Shur-Ofry, Hatch-Waxmanizing.
Copyright, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REv. 171, 174 (2011).
97. For literature describing this phenomenon and proposing various solutions, see Gibson, supra
note 96; Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1271(2008);
Jennifer Rothman, Best Intentions: Reconsidering Best Practices Statements in the Context of Fair
Use and Copyright Law, 75 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 371 (2010); Shur-Ofry, supra note 96.
98. Notably, the possible applicability of the copyright regimes of additional jurisdictions to
specific works, specific cases, and particular uses, which we discuss earlier (note 41 and the
accompanying text), is likely to increase uncertainty and enhance remembrance institutions' risk
aversion.
99. Testimony of Holocaust Memorial Museum, supra note 25. Cf the policy of the Jewish
Museum in Prague, which explicitly refers to copyright constraints in its decisions whether to allow
use of and access to various Holocaust victims' works, such as children's drawings from Terezin -
https://www.jewishmuseum.czlen/info/services/pricelist/. See also EMILY HUDSON, COPYRIGHT
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Overall, the analysis in this Part indicates that copyright law exerts a
significant (if largely ignored) impact on the collective memory of the
Holocaust, as a result of several interrelated factors, primarily-the
Holocaust's problem of representation, the role of remembrance
institutions in shaping the Holocaust's memory, and a gap between
standard copyright doctrine and the radical circumstances of the
Holocaust. These findings call for a closer scrutiny of copyright doctrine
and its interface with Holocaust-related materials. In the following Part,
we embark upon this task and explore the principal conflicts, tensions,
and frictions that arise when applying ordinary copyright doctrine to the
extraordinary circumstances of the Holocaust. Our central claim in this
Part is not merely that copyright law imposes restrictions on the
availability of Holocaust-related materials. Rather, we argue that these
restrictions may be particularly severe, since the regular copyright
'algorithm' is based on narratives and premises concerning the creation
and use of materials that are largely inapplicable to the abnormal
circumstances of the Holocaust, and to the myriad Holocaust-related
materials created under those circumstances.
II. TENSIONS AT THE COPYRIGHT-HOLOCAUST INTERFACE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS
We begin this Part by illuminating the fundamental conflicts between
copyright's general paradigms and Holocaust-related materials-both
victims' and Nazi works. Exposing these conflicts illuminates the
paradoxes that result from the ordinary application of copyright to the
extraordinary circumstances of the Holocaust.1 00 Beyond these general
dissonances, we identify three attributes common to Holocaust-related
materials, whose encounter with copyright doctrine yields particular
tensions: (1) the Holocaust's realities that forced authors to conceal rather
than publish their works sharply contrast with copyright's emphasis on
the publication of works by their authors; (2) the need to utilize authentic,
entire, works in order to convey the Holocaust's realities conflicts with
EXCEPTIONS: THE EXPERIENCES OF CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND
AUSTRALIA (Doctoral Thesis, University of Melbourne, November, 2011) (on file with the authors)
(discussing the complexities of the decision-making process that cultural institutions undergo when
deciding whether to rely upon fair use in the course of their cultural preservation activities). Cf
evidence of similar chilling effects in additional contexts, for example, Patricia Aufderheide & Peter
Jaszi, Untold Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary
Filmmakers (2004), available at http://cmsimpact.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/UNTOLDSTORIES Report.pdf (discussing and demonstrating the negative
implications and costs of rights-clearance requirements in documentary filmmaking that necessitates
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the weight that the fair use doctrine places on transformative and partial
uses of copyrighted works; and (3) the immense number of anonymous
works created by Holocaust victims presents significant challenges when
confronted with the ordinary copyright protection afforded to orphan
works.101
A. Conflicting Narratives
(1) Incentive, Control, and "A Letter in a Bottle"
Copyright's prevalent narrative awards creators exclusive rights over
their works of authorship.1 02 Simply put, the underlying rationale is that
the control afforded by copyright's exclusive rights allows authors to
benefit from the commercial exploitation of their works, which, in turn,
incentivizes cultural production to the advantage of society at large.o10 Of
course, this description is somewhat simplified. Indeed, scholars have
observed that the expectation for monetary return does not comprise the
sole motivation for creation of cultural outputs. Psychological and
intrinsic motivations, for example, play a significant role in the creative
process. 104 Moreover, additional theories of copyright offer more diverse
justifications for the control that authors receive over their works of
authorship. A Lockean approach perceives copyright as a just reward for
the contribution and investment of creators,10 while personality-based
theories regard the personality interests of authors as the primary
justification for affording authors rights in their own works. 06
Notwithstanding the significant variations among these theories, the
concept of authorial control is a central tenet to all of them.
Yet with respect to numerous works produced during the Holocaust by
victims facing genocide, these meta-narratives of 'incentive' and 'control'
101. PartlI.B-Dinfra.
102. See U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress empowered to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
103. See, e.g., William Landes and Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright law, 18
J. LEG. STUD. 325 (1989); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281
(1974); William Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1661 (1988);
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1577
(2009).
104. See, e.g., Dianne Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine
That? 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAw, 29 (2011) (discussing the existence of multiple
motivations for creation, focusing particularly on intrinsic factors).
105. For a discussion of Lockean theory in contemporary writing see, for example, Wendy
Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L.
REv. 149 (1992); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296-330
(1988).
106. Hughes, supra note 105, at pp. 330-355.
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are largely irrelevant. The motivation for these works' creation was not
the expectation for financial gain. Rather, they were created as an explicit
act of cultural and historical preservation for future generations.
Moreover, in these cases, the authors' ultimate goal was not to control but
rather to disseminate their materials. However, copyright law, when
formally applied, can hinder and restrict such dissemination. To illustrate,
let us briefly consider an additional case study: that of the history of the
Kovno Jewish Ghetto Police.
In 1964, construction workers in the city of Kovno, Lithuania,
accidently stumbled upon a crate buried in the ground. The crate
contained thousands of documents, among which was a typed manuscript
consisting of over 200 pages, titled "The History of the Viliampole Jewish
Ghetto Police" ("the History"). 07 . The manuscript was part of a larger
archive, secretly written and assembled during the Holocaust by
anonymous members of the Jewish police that operated in the Kovno
ghetto. 08 It covers events that occurred in the ghetto during the years
1941-1942 and reflects its authors' acute awareness that they might be
documenting the last days of their community, as evident from the
manuscript's opening passages:
It is impossible at this time to sum up, to achieve what might
amount to a comprehensive description of life in the Kovno
ghetto, or to provide a summary of the activities of the ghetto
institutions. First, to this day, we are still, regrettably . . . in the
storm of events . . . . [N]ew pages are added daily, drenched in
tears and blood . . . The time has not yet come to make it possible
to accurately investigate everything . .. .In any event, the future
historian will find here sufficient verified material for the history
of the Kovno Jews in the gruesome years of 1941, 1942 . . . and
this is the most important-objective of the lines that follow.1 09
Similar statements appear in the pages that follow: "If we should not
survive, then perhaps the document we are writing here will fall into the
hands of Jews who will read and be astonished by what was done to us in
the gloomy ghetto.""i0
Although their exact identities are uncertain, in all likelihood the
authors of the History did not survive."' Shortly before they were
107. Samuel D. Kassaow, Preface, in THE CLANDESTINE HISTORY, supra note 30, at xv; Dov
Levin, How the Jewish Police in the Kovno Ghetto Saw Itself (2001),
http://www.yadvashem.org/download/aboutholocaust/studies/LevinEngprint.pdf .
108. Samuel D. Kassaow, Preface, in THE CLANDESTINE HISTORY, supra note 30, at xv.
109. TH-E CLANDESTINE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 63-64.
110. Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
111. Samuel D. Kassaow, Preface, in THE CLANDESTINE HISTORY, supra note 30, at xv
(explaining that most members of the Jewish ghetto police were murdered in the ghetto killing
grounds on March 27, 1944, and few members who survived the ghetto liquidation died in camps
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murdered, when the liquidation of the Kovno ghetto became apparent, the
police's archive, including the History, was placed in a crate and buried in
the ground, where it remained until its accidental exposure some twenty
years later. 112
The text of the History clearly conveys its authors' realization that their
community faces imminent extinction and that the time for an ordinary,
'distant,' historical account might never arrive. The manuscript also
explicitly reveals that its authorship comprises an act of real-time
documentation, designated for the historical, collective memory of future
generations. In fact, the History is illustrative of a widespread sentiment
that motivated the creation of numerous works produced by victims
during the Holocaust. The Oyneg Shabes Archive at the Warsaw ghetto
(discussed above) conveys the acute realization of its creators that, due to
the magnitude of the events, there might be no one left to tell the story of
their communities and their people. 113 Somewhat similarly, the Chronicle
of the Lodz Ghetto, written during the Holocaust by a group of Jewish
intellectuals and scholars, documented the ghetto's day-by-day realities
"when there were over 200,000 Jews living in the ghetto, and when the
ghetto was being emptied, also day by day, until the Jewish population
ceased to exist."' 14
This desire to voice unperceivable realities, to preserve a culture that
was being eradicated, and to affect the memory of future generations was
not confined to semi-structured documentation performed by clandestine
archives; nor was writing its single mode of expression. Similar
motivations resonate in various individual works of diverse genres and
media created by victims during the Holocaust. Numerous personal
diaries reflect a sense of duty to document the mass atrocities and bear
witness to the tragedy."' To illustrate, Anne Frank, barely a teenager
during WWII, rewrote parts of her diary in 1944, after hearing a radio
broadcast of the Dutch government in exile calling on people to document
shortly thereafter); "About Kovno"- YAD VASHEM, THE WORLD HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE
CENTER available at http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/this-month/resources/kovno.asp.
(explaining that of the thirty thousand occupants of the Kovno ghetto, only about eight percent
survived the Holocaust).
112. Id. at 10.
113. Introduction supra, notes 1-7 and the accompanying text.
114. Lucian Dobroszycki, Introduction, THE CHRONICLE OF THE LODz GHETTO, 1941-1944, xxvi
(LUCJAN DOBROSZYCKI, ED., 1987).
115. See Alexandra Garbarini, Holocaust. Diaries, THE YIVO ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWS IN
EASTERN EUROPE, available at
http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Holocaust/HolocaustDiaries (describing this
phenomenon and attributing it partly to a Jewish literary tradition of "bearing witness to a tragedy");
Hartman, supra note 61, at 2 (referring to Jewish chroniclers and diarists who continued "to record
the destruction to the last moment").
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the events of the period.116 In the Lodz ghetto, photographer Mendel
Grossman secretly took thousands of photographs of the mass atrocities
performed by the Nazis, in an act of commemoration for posterity.' 17 His
photos documented people writing last notes to their families, the ghetto
children waiting to be taken from the ghetto to their subsequent death, and
the gradual deterioration of Grossman's own family.118 The creators of the
Kaiser von Atlantis conveyed through music and words the experience of
life and death under inhuman circumstances, thereby sending "a message
in a bottle" to future audiences. 9 Similarly, the poetry of Abraham
Sotzkever, written in the Vilna ghetto, reflects not only the author's real-
time experiences, but also his wishes that his words reach future
generations:
Perhaps these words will endure,
And live to see the light loom,
And in the destined hour
Will unexpectedly bloom?
And like the primeval grain
That turned into a stock
The words will nourish
The words will belong to the people
In its eternal walk.1 20
The aggregation of these examples illuminates the dissonance with
traditional copyright's narratives. Monetary incentives were largely
irrelevant with respect to works created in real time by victims facing
genocide. Rather, commemoration-the intent to leave a trace and tell the
story of an entire community-comprised primary driving forces. In these
cases, dissemination, rather than control, best serves not only the societal
interest in constructing the history and memory of the Holocaust, but also
the authors' will to award their community the "voice" that genocide
116. Foreword, ANNE FRANKE, A DIARY OF A YOUNG GiRL, supra note 29, at 2.
117. See Sheryl Ochayon, Who Took The Pictures: The Ghetto Photography of Mendel
Grossman in Lodz, As Compared With the Ghetto Photography of German "Ghetto Tourists",-Yad
Vashem, The World Holocaust Remembrance Center available at
http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/newsletter/29/who-tookjpicture.asp#01
118. Id.
119. Bilstiger, supra note 10, at 5-6 (using the metaphor of a "message in a bottle" to describe
the Opera's spiritual message). For the story of the opera and its creators, see Introduction supra,
notes 9-13 and the accompanying text.
120. A, Sotzkever, The Grains of Wheat, in A. SOTZKEVER, SELECTED POETRY AND PROSE, 158
(TRANS. BARBARA AND BENJAMIN HARSHAV, 1991).
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attempted to deny. Yet, copyright law, when formally applied, often
restricts such dissemination. As we elaborate below, the problem is
particularly acute regarding anonymous works whose authors most likely
did not survive the genocide.1 21 Ironically, then, Holocaust victims facing
genocide created works with the explicit purpose of documenting and
communicating the Holocaust for future generations, whereas their mass
killing by the Nazis left these materials governed by a proprietary regime,
which burdens their dissemination, contrary to the creators' wishes.
(2) "Ordinary Copyright"?
An additional, mirror-image dissonance arises with respect to
Holocaust-related materials produced by perpetrators, such as organized
documentation of the events by the Nazi regime, propaganda materials,
monographs, or diaries written by prominent Nazi figures. The
subordination of these materials to ordinary copyright protection not only
imposes practical constraints on the Holocaust's historical narratives and
collective memory, but also results in a moral distortion. To illustrate, let
us consider one final case study: the story of the film Triumph of the Will.
Triumph of the Will premiered in Berlin in March 1935.122 Made by the
acclaimed director Leni Riefenstahl at the request of Hitler himself, the
film depicts the 1934 Nuremberg rally of the Nazi Party through powerful
artistic techniques. 123 Rhythmic sequences of military marches, Hitler's
speeches, German folk songs, Wagner's music, and cheering crowds are
all blended to convey the message of the "New Germany"-national
socialism its ideology and Hitler its heroic, messianic. father.1 24 From the
Nazi viewpoint, the result was so successful that after Triumph of the Will
there was no need to make any other propaganda film about Hitler.1 25
Powerful as it was, the film continued to attract attention after the War.1 26
In 1960, a documentary about the Third Reich used excerpts from
Triumph of the Will, contrasting them with scenes from concentration
camps.1 27 The use triggered an immediate legal response by Riefenstahl,
for what she described in her memoir as "a gross infringement of
121. See the discussion in section D, infra.
122. Devereaux, supra note 26, at 348.
123. Id. at 349; DAVID WELSH, PROPAGANDA AND THE GERMAN CINEMA, 1933-1945, 133
(2001).
124. Devereaux, supra note 26, at 351.
125. WELSH, supra note 123, at 134.
126. Devereaux, supra note 26, at 347 (noting that the film is perhaps "the most controversial
film ever made").
127. JURGEN TRIMBORN, LENI RIEFENSTAHL: A LIFE, 240 (TRANS. EDNA McCowN, 2007); LENI
RIEFENSTAHL, LENI RIEFENSTAHL: A MEMOIR, 450 (1995).
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copyright and intellectual theft."1 28 Riefenstahl demanded that the
defendant production company "remove the sequences taken from my
film, or else, as was normal, obtain the rights." 29 The legal proceedings
that followed in Germany ended in 1969, in a decision by the Federal
High Court. The court held that copyright in the film belonged to the Nazi
Party that commissioned its production, not to Riefenstahl, and that the
rights were to be administered by the Federal Republic of Germany.1 30
Despite the ruling, Riefenstahl continued to receive remuneration for
Triumph of the Will, and retained the right to refuse its screening, under
what presumably was a secret agreement with the German authorities. 131
The most striking feature when considering the case of Triumph of the
Will from a copyright perspective is not the question of ownership.
Rather, it is the normalcy with which Riefenstahl, as well as the court,
treated the copyright question, completely ignoring the contents of the
work, the role it played in the history of the Holocaust, or the
circumstances surrounding its creation. In fact, this 'ordinariness' is
common to the treatment of copyright in Nazi materials by various courts
and jurisdictions.1 3 2 As described above, in 1939 an American court
declared Mein Kampf a copyright-protected work and held that its
unauthorized distribution triggers regular remedies for copyright
infringement. 13 3 Akin to Riefenstahl's reference to her right to control
Triumph of the Will as "normal," 34 the U.S. court rejected the contention
that copyright in Mein Kampf was invalid in light of the work's
contents-proclaiming this argument "bold" and reinforcing the
seemingly normal application of copyright under the circumstances. 135
Likewise, in 2015, in a dispute concerning the publication of extracts
from Joseph Goebbels' diaries as part of a scientific work, a German court
affirmed that copyright continues in the diaries, noting that under the
circumstances the assertion of remuneration by Goebbels' heirs "cannot
be regarded as morally objectionable."1 36 Copyright in the diaries (which
128. RIEFENSTAHL, supra note 127, at 450.
129. Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
130. Urt. v. 10.01.1969, Az.: I ZR 48/67; TRIMBORN, supra note 127, at 240-41.
131. TRIMBORN, supra note 127, at 241-42; Julia Jacobs & Philipp Schepp, Triumph des Wileens,
in THOMAS HOEREN & LENA MEYER EDS., VERBOTENE FILME, 167, 184-85 (2007) (in German);
RAINER ROTHER, LENI RIEFNSTAHL: THE SEDUCTION OF GENIUS, 158 (MARTIN H. BOTT, TRANS.,
2002) (". . . Transit Film GmbH only authorizes showings of Triunph des Willens after consulting
Leni Riefenstahl").
132. Cf Bogedain, supra note 34, at 208 (explaining that under German law copyright subsists in
Nazi writings, regardless of the illegality or immorality of such works).
133. See the discussion of Mein Kampf in Introduction supra, notes 14-23 and the accompanying
text.
134. RIEFENSTAHL, supra note 127, at 450.
135. Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 104 F.2d 306, 312 (2 Cir., 1939).
136. Case Number 21 0 28238/13 Schacht v. Verlagsgruppe Random House (Regional Ct. of
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include sentences like "the Jewish plague needs to be eradicated. Utterly")
was reaffirmed by a higher court. The court acknowledged "the author
Joseph Goebbels' right of personality" while rejecting defendants'
contention that the issue was of fundamental importance. 137 Similarly,
various European archives currently hold the rights to numerous original
film footages depicting the actual genocide. These archives often charge
regular royalties, which may amount to thousands of dollars per minute,
from parties wishing to make use of these materials. 138 As one archivist
noted: "although the Holocaust is one of the most tragic chapters of the
Hungarian history, we sell material about it just like we sell any other
material of ours."139
Notably, for a certain period after WWII, copyright in numerous Nazi
materials, alongside myriad additional works of European authors, was
vested with the U.S. General Attorney or the Alien Property Custodian.140
However, after 1962, the vast majority of copyrights in Nazi materials
were returned to their original owners (or their heirs).141 Such was the
case, for example, with respect to Triumph of the Will. A handful of cases
were excluded from this divestment, and the U.S. Government continued
to manage their copyright. Among those were Hitler's Mein Kampf and
the Goebbels Diaries.1 42 While these exceptions prevented the payment of
Munich, 24.9.2014), at p. 8 (copy with the authors, translated from German).
137. Case Number 6 U 3707/14 Schacht v. Verlagsgruppe Random House (Higher Regional Ct.
of Munich, 14.8.2015), at 13, 8 (copy with the authors, quote translated from German, emphasis
added). See also JEREMY BLACK, THE HOLOCAUST, HISTORY & MEMORY, 174-175 (2016); Alberge,
supra note 27.
138. See Judy Maltz & Victor Isaac Taranto, Who Profits from Holocaust Archives, HA'ARETZ,
(Apr. 8, 2013) http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/features/the-unbearably-high-cost-of-holocaust-
footage.premium-1.514081.
139. Maltz & Taranto, supra note 138 (quoting Janos Varga, a senior researcher at the Hungarian
National Digital Archive and Film Institute).
140. The vesting was executed under the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917
("TWEA"), which was first enacted during WWI and was amended over the years. A thorough review
of this statutory scheme exceeds the scope of this article. In general, the proceeds from the
administration of these properties during Government ownership were transferred to the War Claims
Fund and used to satisfy war-related claims and damages. For the history of the TWEA and its
amendments, see Paul V. Myron, The Work of the Alien Property Custodian, 11 LAW & CONT.
PROBLEMS (1945); George Middleton, Rights and Royalties of Foreign Authors and Composers in
War Time, 10 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 26 (1962); Michael J. Bazyler & Amber L. Fitzgerald,
Trading With The Enemy: Holocaust Restitution, the United States Government, and American
Industry, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 683 (2002).
141. An Act to Amend the War Claims Act of 1948, Pub. Law 87-846, 87th Cong., H.R. 7283,
76 Stat. 1107 (1962) ("the 1962 Amendment"). Section 42(c) of the 1962 Amendment provided that
all copyrights vested under the TWEA, save for a few exceptions, were returned to their owners "as a
matter of grace." For detailed analyses of this statutory scheme, see Martin Domke, The War Claims
Act of1962, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. VOL. 57, 354, 370-71 (1963); Middleton, supra note 140.
142. The additional excepted Nazi works were the photo collection of the official Nazi
photographer Heinrich Hoffman, Otto Skorzeny's work, and the memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg, one of
the principal ideologues of the Nazi Party-see the 1962 Amendment, Section 42(c); Middleton,
supra note 140, at 35.
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royalties to the successors of Hitler or Goebbels,1 43 they did not bar the
intense commercialization of their works, which relied on the subsistence
of copyright. In fact, both Mein Kampf and the Goebbels Diaries were
heavily commercialized in the United States after WWII, generating
royalties not only to the U.S. Government, but also to third parties. 144
Overall, the emerging picture reveals another paradox at the copyright-
Holocaust interface: through its system of allocating private rights,
copyright awards the Holocaust perpetrators, or their successors, a certain
ability to control the Holocaust's narrative, allowing them to impact what
can be said about the past, by whom, and under which conditions.1 45 And
even when this control was limited under the TWEA exception scheme,
the limitation applied only to a handful of cases and was based on external
legislation, rather than on any internal mechanism embedded in copyright
law. 146 In fact, the normal application of copyright law even to the most
extreme Nazi materials was taken for granted.
Indeed, copyright law's long-established paradigm adopts an objective,
content-neutral approach to copyright protection.1 47 Yet such ordinary
143. See, e.g., Legislative History of the War Claims Act of 1948, Amendment: P.L. 87-846: 76
Stat. 1107 : October 22, 1962. 6872 (1962).
144. See, e.g., Bazyler & Pitzgerald, supra note 140, at 733-34 (describing the sales of Mein
Kampf in the United States after WWII, and the subsequent sale of copyright by the Government to
Houghton Mifflin, the publisher who originally contracted with Hitler's publishers to distribute the
book in the U.S.); For a detailed discussion of the copyright history of the book, see Guy Pessach &
Michal Shur-Ofry, Copyright and Mein Kampf-Another Look at Copyright Neutrality (unpublished
manuscript, copy with the authors). See also Bertrand M. Patenaude, Curse of the Goebbels Diaries,
2012 (3) THE HOOVER DIGEST, available at https://www.hoover.org/research/curse-goebbels-diaries
(noting that the Goebbels Diaries, distributed in the United States in 1948, became "an instant best-
seller," and describing the ensuing legal battle between the finders of the diaries and the Office of
Alien Property).
145. Cf Savelsberg & King, supra note 67, at 197 (noting that the law can shape collective
memory by "regulating what can be said about the past").
146. Notably, Section 104A of the Copyright Act, which sets out an automatic restoration
scheme for copyright in foreign works that were in the public domain, may constitute a narrow
exception. The provision includes an exception to restoration with respect to works "in which the
copyright was ever owned or administered by the Alien Property Custodian and in which the restored
work would be owned by a government or instrumentality thereof ... While the purpose of the
exception is not entirely clear, one can presume that the intent was to preclude official works of
enemy regimes from restoration of copyright-see William Patry, The Anschluss and Expropriation of
Jewish Copyright in Europe, THE PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG, MARCH 12, 2008,
http://williampatry.blogspot.co.il/2008/03/anschluss-and-expropriation-of-jewish.html (noting that the
purpose of the exception was "to ensure that the German and Japanese governments do not receive
protection for their wartime works" but that it does not apply to works created by individuals).
147. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT Vol 2, p. 3-12 (2016); Ned Snow,
Content Based Copyright Denial, 90 IND. L. J. 1473 (2015) (reviewing the principle of content
neutrality under copyright law and its relation to free speech principles); Bleistein v. Donadlson
Lithographing Co, 98 F 608, 611 (1899); Belcher v. Tarbox 486 F2d. 1087, 1088 (9'. Cir. 1973)
("...there is nothing in the Copyright Act to suggest that the courts are to pass upon the truth or falsity
of the views embodied in a copyrighted work"); cf the decision of the German Court in the matter of
Goebbels diaries, Case Number 21 0 28238/13 Schacht v. Verlagsgruppe Random House (Regional
Ct. of Munich, 24.9.2014), at 7 (referring to the "prevalent understanding" that "copyright may also
be acquired in works of immoral or criminal content") (copy with the authors, translated from
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application of copyright protection to the aforesaid works creates an
implicit, indirect impression that these are just ordinary literary, artistic,
dramatic, or musical works, which the copyright system was designed to
promote. In other words, affording such works the regular protection of
copyright and granting their creators the stamp of authorship normalizes
the works is itself far from neutral. Rather, it aestheticizes these works,
and indirectly undermines their abnormal contents. In this sense too,
applying copyright in its (seemingly) content-neutral, regular manner
creates a moral distortion. 148
Altogether, the foregoing analysis exposes fundamental dissonances
between copyright's prevalent narratives and the extreme realities of the
Holocaust. On the one hand, victims facing genocide authored materials
to 'voice' the genocide to future generations; yet their mass murder during
that genocide left these materials governed by a proprietary regime that
poses an obstacle to their dissemination. On the other hand, in a
somewhat reverse manner, the documentation of the genocide by the
Nazis is subject to proprietary rights, that in many cases are controlled by
successors of the Nazi regime. In the following sections we proceed to
identify more specific doctrinal tensions that arise when the unique
attributes of the Holocaust encounter ordinary copyright doctrine.
B. Publication versus Concealment
Consistent with its predominant narrative of authorial control, copyright
doctrine emphasizes "the author's right to decide whether and when ...
[the work] will be made public."1 49 Thus, the right of first publication is
one of the exclusive rights granted under the Copyright Act.so In
addition, the question of whether the work is published or unpublished
carries substantial weight under the fair use doctrine. One of the factors
that courts are instructed to consider in applying the doctrine, as specified
in the statutory fair use provision, is "the nature of the copyrighted
work."151 In the famous decision of Harper & Row, the U.S. Supreme
German). For criticism of the "aesthetic neutrality" approach, see the discussion infra, notes 242-244
and the accompanying text.
148. For a similar argument concerning the intersection of "art and evil" in Triumph of the Will,
compare Devereaux, supra note 26, at 357-58 (arguing that appreciating the artistic beauty of
Triumph of the Will without attending to its contents is "morally dangerous"). We do not, however,
make the simple (possibly simplistic) claim that copyright law should not protect all hateful or evil
contents. The doctrinal response we propose to the anomaly we identify here is more nuanced. For
elaboration, see Part II.B, infra.
149. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S 539, 563 (1985).
150. 17 U.S.C.S. § 106 ("... the owner of copyright under this title ... has the exclusive rights to.
... distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending").
151. For the Fair Use provision under the Copyright Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (emphasis added):
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including
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Court established that 'the fact that a work is unpublished is a critical
element of its 'nature' . . . [and] tends to negate fair use." 152 A series of
subsequent District Court cases reinforced and advanced this
interpretation.153 Although the fair use provision in the Copyright Act was
later amended to clarify that "[t]he fact that a work is unpublished shall
not itself bar a finding of fair use,"1 5 4 scholarly analyses indicate that the
unpublished nature of a work still weighs against a finding of fair use. 5 5
Copyright's stance towards unpublished works largely stems from the
law's respect for the author's "deliberate choice" regarding whether and
when to publish her work.1 56 Yet regarding works created by victims in
ghettos, concentration camps, and extermination camps, such "deliberate
choice" was virtually non-existent. Any attempt to publish a work during
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all the above factors.
152. Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 551 & 564 (rejecting an argument that a publication of passages
from former president Ford's unpublished biography in a newspaper article comprised fair use). For a
discussion of the case and its implications, see, for example, Diane Conley, Author, User, Scholar,
Thief Fair Use and Unpublished Works, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 15 (1990).
153. For several prominent (though not exhaustive) examples, see, Salinger v. Random House
Inc. 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2nd Cir. 1987) (discussing the unpublished work of J.D. Salinger and holding
that unpublished works "normally enjoy complete protection against copying any protected
expression"); New Era Publications v. Henry Holt, 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1524 (21. Cir. 1989)
(discussing unpublished letters and diary entries of Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of
Scientology, and referring to "[a] strong presumption against the finding of fair use in unpublished
materials").
154. Pub. L. No. 102492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000
& Supp. IV 2004)). For a review of the history of the amendment, see Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of
Unpublished Works: Burdens ofProofand the Integrity ofCopyright, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1 (1999).
155. See, e.g., Crews, supra note 154, at 10 (arguing that following the amendment, uncertainties
remain that "leave in doubt the ability of writers and publishers to utilize unpublished works"); Barton
Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
612-615 (2008) (finding that 29 out of 37 cases concerning unpublished works asserted that this fact
disfavored a finding of fair use, while the fact that the work is published has become a stronger
positive factor, favoring fair use); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2537, 2579 (2009) ("[djrawing expression from unpublished or unfinished works is likely to cut
against fair use"); but cf Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. 47, 77 (2012) (presenting an
empirical study that finds no significant effect of the unpublished nature of the work on a finding of
fair use).
156. Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 553 ("[t]he applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished
works is narrowly limited, since, although the work is unavailable, this is a result of a deliberate
choice on part of the copyright owner") (emphasis added). See also M.B. NIMMER, D. NIMMER,
NIMMERON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 [B][2][b][iii] (New York, Matthew Bender, 2015).
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the Holocaust risked the lives of its authors and their families and often
amounted to a death sentence.157 In the face of genocide, concealment,
rather than publication, was the only way open to victims to try and
ensure-with no certainty whatsoever-that their "letter in a bottle" may
reach an audience, that future generations would be able to access their
works, and that their voice might be heard at some future time.
At times, authors facing imminent death gave their works to fellow
victims for safekeeping, as Viktor Ullmann had done with respect to the
Kaiser of Altantis.5 8 In other instances, the only available route was to
bury the works underground. 159 Thus, the Oyneg Shabes archives were
buried in metal boxes and milk cans beneath the Warsaw ghetto;' 60 the
History of the Viliampole Jewish Ghetto Police was placed in crates and
buried in the grounds of the Kovno ghetto, along with additional
archives;1 61 batches of the Chronicle of the Lodz Ghetto were hidden
beneath the ghetto's fire department and in the grounds of its Jewish
cemetery;1 62 and photographer Mendel Grossman hid his collection of
photos from the Lodz ghetto, comprising thousands of negatives, in a
hollow space under a windowsill.1 63 Even in the most extreme, final stage
of the genocide, Jewish prisoners working in the gas chambers and
crematoria at Auschwitz-Birkenau buried various manuscripts beneath the
ashes of the crematoria, in the hope that one day they would be
discovered. 164
These examples clearly illustrate, that in the extreme reality of the
Holocaust, concealment resulted neither from a "deliberate choice" nor
from the authors being unready to divulge their intellectual endeavours. In
fact, burial was the only means that could lead to publication, albeit at
157. See, e.g., Garbarini, supra note 115 (explaining that if discovered, a diary written during the
Holocaust would endanger the life of the writer and possibly his family); Stephen Charles Feinstein,
Art and the Holocaust, in THE YIVO ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWS IN EASTERN EUROPE, available at
http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Holocaust/Art-and-the_Holocaust (describing how the
exposure of a group that attempted to smuggle paintings depicting life in Thereseinstadt resulted in
group members' deportation); Glenn Sujo, LEGACIES OF SILENCE: VISUAL ART AND THE
HOLOCAUST, 104-107 (2001) (referring to the exposure of clandestine art works in ghettos and
concentration camps that resulted in the artists deportation and murder); cf Dobroszycki, supra note
114, at xviii (explaining that due to the dangers of exposure by the Nazis, the chroniclers in the Lodz
Ghetto limited themselves to facts and descriptions and refrained from expressing any feelings).
158. Supra notes 12-13 and the accompanying text.
159. Garbarini, supra note 115 (explaining that the typical way to preserve manuscripts of
Holocaust diaries was "by giving them to someone for safekeeping or by hiding them in the ground or
in the walls of buildings").
160. Supra notesl-6 and the accompanying text.
161. Supra, notes 107-110 and the accompanying text.
162. Dobroszycki, supra note 114, at xv, n22 (further explaining that the batch buried at the
cemetery was tracked down by the Nazis).
163. Ochayon, supra, note 117.
164. Garbarini, supra note 115; NICHOLAS CHARE & DOMINIC WILLIAMS, MATTERS OF
TESTIMONY-INTERPRETING THE SCROLLS OF AUSCHWITZ, vii (2016).
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some unknown, uncertain, future time. As David Graber eloquently
elucidated in his heart-breaking note that accompanied the burial of the
Oyneg Shabes archive, "[w]hat we were unable to cry and shriek out to
the world we buried in the ground."I 65
Applying ordinary copyright doctrine, therefore, results (again) in clear
irony: victims' works were concealed deliberately in order to enable their
future dissemination; yet viewed through the copyright lens, this very fact
renders them unpublished works, thereby hindering a finding of fair use
and undermining their chances of being disseminated.
C. Transformative & Partial versus Authentic & Complete
An additional tension at the copyright-Holocaust interface concerns the
weight that the fair use doctrine places on transformative and partial uses,
as opposed to plain reproductions of entire copyrighted works.
In the famous case of Campbell v. Acuff Rose, the transformative nature
of the use was embraced as part of the first factor in the fair use
analysis, 16 6 following a proposal by Judge Pierre Leval. 167 The underlying
assumption is that transformative uses are creative and therefore better
promote copyright's objectives, in comparison to "mere reproductions" of
existing works that do not add new layers of creativity to the cultural and
artistic eco-system.1 68 In addition, transformative uses are often associated
with criticism, protest and contrarianism; thus, they are considered
essential from a free-speech perspective.1 69 Overall, theoretical and
empirical scholarly analyses demonstrate that the fair use doctrine clearly
favors transformative uses and increasingly disfavors uses that involve
copying without transformation. 170
165. Introduction supra notes 5-6 and the accompanying text.
166. Campbell v. Acuff Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ("Although such transformative use is
not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, . . . the goal of copyright, to promote science and the
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.").
167. Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REI'. 1105, 1111 (1990) ("[T]he
answer to the question of justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged
use is transformative. The use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different
manner or for a different purpose from the original. A quotation of copyrighted material that merely
repackages or republishes the original is unlikely to pass the test . . . .") (emphasis in the original).
168. Id. at 1111 ("if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings-this is the very type of activity that the
fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society"); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579
(transformative "works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space
within the confines of copyright").
169. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L. J. 535, 558 (2004); C. Edvin Baker, First Amendment Limits on
Copyright, VAND. L. REv. 891, 941-42 (2002) (explaining that from a First Amendment perspective
protecting transformative uses is "perhaps the highest priority", particularly due to their dissident,
norm-challenging character).
170. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 169, at 546, 556-59 (maintaining that courts perceive non-
transformative copying as "increasingly unfair"); Beebe, supra note 155, at 605-606 (presenting
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In addition to the doctrine's emphasis on transformation, the third
factor in the fair use analysis instructs the courts to consider "the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole."171 The test, as applied by the courts, is both quantitative and
qualitative; 172 yet the former is particularly important for the present
purposes. Simply put, under this test, copying an entire copyrighted work
is less likely to be considered fair use than quoting partial segments from
the work. 173 Indeed, the age of digitization has yielded certain recognition
that the copying of entire works may be necessary for the operation of
digital technologies, and in certain cases may constitute fair use. 174 Yet, as
we discuss in detail in the next section, this recognition is limited in its
scope; while the fair use doctrine may extend to the formation of digital
archives, it does not extend to granting public access to entire copyrighted
works stored in those archives. 175 Altogether, then, a non-transformative
use of an entire copyrighted work is less likely to be considered fair use,
in comparison to transformative paraphrases and partial quotations. 176
This state of affairs attracted some scholarly criticism. In a prominent
critique, Rebecca Tushnet articulates that in some instances, copying and
dissemination of works in their entirety better serves important free-
speech interests in comparison to partial or transformative use. 177 Such is
the case, for example, when exposure to original materials better
promotes political and cultural discourse, or when using one's own words
to convey a message is less powerful than using the original text.178
Indeed, these tensions with the fair use doctrine are not unique to the
Holocaust; they arise with respect to various copyrighted materials of
historical and cultural significance. 17 9 Yet the case of Holocaust-related
materials may be an extreme and paradigmatic embodiment of these
empirical findings that transformativeness is sufficient to trigger an overall finding of fair use, while
non-transformative uses substantially decrease the likelihood of such finding).
171. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (3) (emphasis added).
172. See, e.g., Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S 539, 583 (1985); Campbell, 510
U.S. at 587-88; PATRY supra note 147, Vol. 4, p. 10-488 (2016).
173. Sag, supra note 155, at 79 ("transformative use and partial copying are both strong
indicators of fair use").
174. Sag, id,. at 84.
175. Part I1.D infra, notes 207-210, and the accompanying text.
176. Sag, supra note 155, at 79.
177. Tushnet, supra note 169, at 565-584.
178. Id. at 565, 575. See also Nimmer, supra note 58, at 1186-1204 (demonstrating the
importance of direct authentic documentation as a means to convey the meaning and ramifications of
historical events); Netanel, supra note 59, at 14-15 (exemplifying how verbatim quotation from
literary works significantly enhances the effectiveness of communicating the meaning, significance,
and implications of the quoted text).
179. See, e.g., Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S 539, 557 (1985) (court referring to
"the fact that the words the President [Ford] has chosen to clothe his narrative may be 'newsworthy'
but holding that this fact is "not an independent justification for copying of the author's expression").
152 [Vol. 30:2
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tensions. When such materials are concerned the gap between the use of
entire authentic materials and any partial transformation thereof may be
particularly large, and the conflict with the fair use doctrine particularly
acute. As the discussion above indicates, the extremity of the Holocaust
creates a problem of representation; namely, a failure on the part of
people external to the events to grasp the Holocaust's realities. 80
Therefore, describing the Holocaust in retrospect through "transformative
paraphrases" is considerably less powerful, less meaningful, and less
effective, in comparison to using authentic materials, created in real time
by those who were 'inside the events'.'18 The realities of ghettos,
concentration camps, and extermination camps may become a little more
comprehensible (albeit certainly not easy to grasp) if one views the
photographs of Mendel Grossman from the Lodz ghetto,1 82 reads the notes
of prisoners who worked at the crematoria in Birkenau,' 83 or listens to the
Kaiser von Atlantis composed in Theresienstadt.1 84 With respect to such
materials, the most appropriate images, words, or sounds are those that
victims voiced from within the events.
Moreover, the emphasis that the fair use doctrine places on
transformative uses reflects the law's recognition of the value of
contrarianism and resistance. 185 Yet with respect to the Holocaust, the
ultimate cases of dissidence and resistance are embodied not in
transformation but in the authentic materials created by victims during the
events. Created in secrecy often at a risk to the lives of their creators,
many of these works constitute ultimate examples of human resistance
under impossible conditions. 186 As our previous discussion indicates,
hindering their dissemination in an entire, authentic, form not only harms
free-speech values. It can also adversely impact the intergenerational,
collective memory of the Holocaust.' 87
Notably, the attempt to understand and construct the Holocaust's
historical narratives and collective memory also necessitates access to
authentic materials created by the Nazi regime. It is difficult to perceive
the Nazi ideology if one is exposed only to abridged segments of Mein
180. See the discussion supra, Part IB, notes 61-65 and the accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., CHARE & WILLIAMS, supra note 164, at 17 (referring to the writings found in the
remnants of Auschwitz-Birkenau as documents from "inside the events," the publication of which
might alleviate the problem of"unrepresentability of the Holocaust").
182. For the story of Grossman's photo archive, see supra notes 117-118 and the accompanying
text.
183. For the diaries written at Auschwitz-Birkenau, see supra, note 164 and the accompanying
text.
184. For the story of Kaiser von Atlantis, see supra notes 9-13 and the accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 169 and the accompanying text.
186. Supra, notes 157-164 and the accompanying text.
187. Part I, supra.
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Kampf, rather than to the entire text;188 if one cannot cite verbatim
paragraphs from the diaries of Joseph Goebbels;189 or if screening footage
from the propaganda film Triumph of the Will is prohibited. 190 Likewise,
no second-hand, transformative description of the genocide can parallel
watching the original photographs or footage taken by the perpetrators in
real time.1 91
Finally, and importantly, with respect to Holocaust-related materials
transcending the transformative use paradigm is also vital for subsequent
uses that are themselves transformative. The initial possibility to preserve
Holocaust-related works in their entirety and to make them available to
the public often constitutes the sole practical means to use these works
further in transformative, socially valuable manners, such as in
documentary films, research books, or artistic works. The recent
"Yolocaust" project, which depicted 'selfies' taken at the Holocaust
memorial in Berlin merged with original photos from Auschwitz is one
illustration for such a transformation. 19 2 Yet, as previously explained,
numerous Holocaust-related materials are not accessible through
widespread market distribution channels. Their availability for further
transformative uses often depends on their initial preservation and upon
making them accessible to the public by Holocaust remembrance
institutions.99 This preliminary stage, however, is not transformative by
nature. Thus, copyright's emphasis on transformation may undermine
both access to authentic Holocaust-related materials and secondary,
subsequent, transformative uses of these materials.
D. The Anonymous Masses
An additional tension at the copyright-Holocaust interface results from
the protection that copyright law grants to orphan works, exacerbated by
copyright's broad control over processes of mass digitization.1 94 Projects
of mass digitization have been thriving with the development of digital
technology and the new prospects it provides for museums, archives, and
188. For copyright disputes involving the publication of the unedited manuscript of Mein Kampf,
including successful lawsuits on behalf of Hitler's authorized publishers, see supra, notes 19-23 and
the accompanying text.
189. For the recent court proceedings concerning cited paragraphs from Goebbels' diaries, see
supra, notes 137-137 and the accompanying text.
190. For copyright disputes involving Triumph of the Will, see supra, notes 122-131 and the
accompanying text.
191. For applicable copyright and royalty policies with respect to such archival materials, see
supra, notes 138-139 and the accompanying text.
192. For the project, created by artist Shahak Shapira, see https://yolocaust.de/; Allison Kaplan-
Sommer, No More Shoah Selfies: Why the Controversial 'Yolocaust' Project Was Taken Down,
HA'ARETZ, Jan. 27, 2017, available at http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/features/.premium-1.767709.
193. Part I supra, notes 89 and the accompanying text.
194. For the term 'orphan works', see Part I supra, note 83 and the accompanying text.
[Vol. 30:2154
34
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol30/iss2/2
Pessach & Shur-Ofry
other preservation projects.195 Yet from a copyright perspective, the
combination of orphan works and mass digitization poses significant
challenges.
In general, orphan works receive ordinary copyright protection in the
United States, which implies that their exploitation by third parties is
subject to the copyright owners' consent. 196 Of course, if these owners are
unknown or unreachable, the clearance of rights is practically impossible.
Therefore, the subsistence of copyright in orphan works in its ordinary,
property-rule-based form may deter third parties from using these works
altogether. 197
The problem of orphan works becomes more acute in the age of mass
digitization, where projects often aim at digitizing complete collections of
physical materials, comprising innumerable copyright protected works. In
general, these acts require the permission of the copyright owners in the
various works. In many cases, searching the right-holders and securing
ex-ante permissions for digitization on a case-by-case basis is costly and
impractical, even when the copyright owners presumably can be
identified. Obviously, the difficulty intensifies when such collections
contain large amounts of orphan works. 198 Therefore, the combination of
orphan works and mass digitization may effectively prevent many digital
preservation projects from materializing. 199
Both policy makers and scholars have dedicated considerable attention
to the triad of copyright, orphan works, and mass digitization.2 00 The
195. See, e.g., DANIEL J. COHEN & ROY ROSENZWEIG, DIGITAL HISTORY, 3-9 (2005) (listing the
principal qualities of digital media and networks that form the revolutionary character of digital
preservation: capacity, accessibility, flexibility, diversity, manipulability, interactivity and
hypertextuality); Pessach, supra note 86.
196. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION REPORT, supra note 91, at 2-3.
197. Id. at 3 (explaining that the possibility that the copyright owner would eventually emerge
and seek an injunction or damages creates a "legal cloud" that impedes the use of orphan works); Jane
C. Ginsburg, Contracts, Orphan Works, and Copyright Norms: What Role for Berne and TRIPs? in
ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, HARRY FIRST & DIANE LEENHEER ZIMMERMAN, ED., WORKING
WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 471, 483 (2010) (explaining that would-be
exploiters of orphan works must decide whether to renounce their project or incur a legal risk of the
copyright owner reappearing to demand infringement remedies).
198. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION REPORT, supra note 91, at 11.
199. See Zimmerman, supra note 90, 998-1003 (2007) (discussing the problem of preserving
copyrighted works, particularly through digitization, due to the constrains imposed by copyright
protection); Ginsburg, supra note 197, at 483 (explaining that for museums and cultural institutions,
the problem of orphan works goes hand in hand with digitization efforts).
200. See, e.g., Pessach, supra note 86; Zimmerman, supra note 90; Kenyon & Hudson, supra
note 90; Pallante, supra note 91; Ginsburg, supra note 197; Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments
in US Copyright Law: Part I - 'Orphan' Works 217 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR,
176 (2008); Ryan Andrews, Note: Contracting Out of the Orphan Works Problem: How the Google
Book Search Settlement Serves as a Private Solution to the Orphan Works Problem and why it should
Matter to Policy Makers, 19 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 97 (2009); Joshua 0. Mausner, Copyright Orphan
Works: A Multi-Pronged Solution to Solve a Harmful Market Inefficiency, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 395
(2007); David B. Sherman, Cost and Resource Allocation Under the Orphan Works Act of 2006:
Would the Act Reduce Transaction Costs, Allocate Orphan Works Efficiently, and Serve the Goals of
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predominant view emerging from these extensive debates is that the
current copyright regime lacks mechanisms to effectively overcome the
problem. Two statutory exceptions under the current copyright doctrine
are particularly relevant in this context. The first is a specific statutory
exemption for preservation, under Section 108 of the Copyright Act. The
second is the fair use doctrine.
Briefly, Section 108 allows libraries and archives to reproduce and
distribute a limited number of copies of copyrighted works under certain
specific conditions. 201 While the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
slightly expanded the original exception 202 the Act also limited its scope
by providing that "any . . . copy . . . that is reproduced in digital format"
must not be "made available to the public in that format outside the
premises of the library or archives." 203 Although Section 108 reflects a
fundamental recognition that libraries and archives play a significant role
Copyright Law?, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2007). See also ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION
REPORT, supra note 91; WIPO STUDY ON COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS FOR LIBRARIES
AND ARCHIVES, 16, available at:
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc-detailsjsp?doc id=109192; UNITED KINGDOM INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS, available at: http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-types/pro-copy/c-
policy/c-policy-orphanworks.htm; INTERNATIONAL STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF COPYRIGHT LAW ON
DIGITAL PRESERVATION JULY 2008 A JOINT REPORT OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS NATIONAL
DIGITAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRESERVATION PROGRAM, at 36, available at:
http://www.digitalpreservation.gov/library/resources/pubs/docs/digital preservation-final report2008
.pdf.
201. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000). Subsection 108 (a) instructs that the work must be reproduced
without any purpose of obtaining direct or indirect commercial advantage from the copy; the
collections of the entity making the reproduction must be open to the public or otherwise available to
specialized researchers; and the work that is reproduced or distributed must include a copyright notice
or a legend stating that the work may be protected by copyright, even if no copyright notice appears
on the reproduced copy. Subsection (b) authorizes the duplication of unpublished works "solely for
purposes of preservation and security or for deposit for research use in another qualifying library or
archive," as long as the work reproduced "is currently in the collections of the library or archives."
The provision was intended to apply to "an archival collection of original manuscripts, papers, and the
like, most of which are unpublished, and for which a rigorous preservation regime serves the needs of
archives and scholars." See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS, 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1983), available at http:// www.copyright.gov/reports/ibrary-
reproduction-1983.pdf Subsection (c) addresses the reproduction of published works "duplicated
solely for the purpose of replacement" and also allows for the reproduction of three copies if the
library or archive making the copy has determined "after a reasonable effort" that "an unused
replacement cannot be obtained at a fair price." This subsection was intended to ensure that items in a
library collection are preserved in a usable form, despite external factors such as time and technology
that are beyond an institution's control. For a discussion of Section 108, see Mary Rasenberger &
Chris Weston, Overview of the Libraries and Archives Exception in the Copyright Act: Background,
History, and Meaning (Apr. 14, 2005), available at http://
www.loc.gov/sectionl08/docs/108_background paper.doc; Roberta R. Kwall, Contract Options for
Individual Artists: Library Reproduction Rights for Preservation and Replacement in the Digital Era:
An Author's Perspective on § 108, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 343 (2006) (explaining that Section 108 is
almost obsolete in the case of digital preservation of cultural materials).
202. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 103, 1201, 112
Stat. 2860, 2863-65 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 1201 (2000)). The amendment
increased the number of permitted copies and also allowed libraries to make digital reproductions for
preservation and replacement.
203. Id. Notably, this limitation applies to Sections 108(b) and (c).
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in "providing access to the cultural memory," 204 it does not allow the
provision of public access to the digitally preserved materials. Therefore,
its usefulness for digital preservation projects that aim to make the
digitally archived contents publicly available is extremely limited, if at all
applicable. 205 In addition, the section does not mention museums among
the cultural institutions that can benefit from the exception, thus excluding
a broad category of institutions involved in mass digitization projects. 206
The fair use doctrine does not change the picture substantially. Recent
case law applied the doctrine in a manner that allows certain mass
digitization of copyright-protected collections, yet simultaneously limits
the public availability of the digitized texts. Thus, in Authors Guild v.
Google,207 Google successfully relied on the fair use doctrine with respect
to its Library Project. The project included the scanning of entire
collections of books from several major academic and public libraries into
Google's databases, allowing users to electronically browse snippets from
the books that were subject to copyright. 208 Google's reproduction of
entire copyrighted works for archival and retrieval purposes was held a
permitted fair use, yet only insofar as public access was limited to the
partial extracts from the copyrighted works. Somewhat similarly, in
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust,209 the court was willing to recognize
that the creation of a digital database of millions of books from research
library collections constitutes. fair. use, provided that the database grants
no general public access to the scanned books, but rather limits such
access in various manners.210 While these two decisions reflect a certain
expansion of the fair use doctrine to allow the digital reproduction and
storage of large collections of entire copyrighted works, they also
reinforce the doctrine's traditional distinction between partial and entire
copying by requiring that the digital copies not be made available to the
public in their entirety. 211
Numerous policy makers have addressed the problem of orphan works
and mass digitization, yielding various proposals for legislative
amendments. 212 A full discussion of these proposals exceeds the scope of
204. See SECTION 108 STUDY GROUP - INFORMATION FOR THE 2006 PUBLIC ROUNDTABLE AND
REQUEST FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS, available at
http://www.section108.gov/docs/Secl08StudyGroupReport.pdf, at 43.
205. Id. at 57-60 (arguing that current law lacks a scheme that would enable public-oriented
remembrance institutions to function in a networked environment).
206. Id. at 31-34.
207. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202.
208. Id. at 212-229.
209. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
210. Id. at 97. Most notably, access to the full text was limited to library patrons with disabilities.
211. See the discussion in section C, supra.
212. See SECTION 108 STUDY GROUP, note 205 supra; ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS
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this article. The important point for our purposes is the broad consensus
that the current copyright exemptions scheme is incapable of providing a
solution to the challenges of orphan works and mass digitization.
This problem too, though not unique to the Holocaust, is exacerbated in
regard to Holocaust-related materials. Indeed, the mass murder and
extreme conditions of the Holocaust yielded a huge amount of victims'
works whose authors are unknown. 213 Registration of copyright in these
works was not a practical option given the circumstances of their
creation.214 Therefore, the exercise of reasonable efforts will likely not
result in identification of the authors of myriad Holocaust-related works,
and obtaining copyright clearance for such works is not a practical
option. 215 Moreover, although the reasonable assumption is that many
(possibly most) of these anonymous authors did not survive the
Holocaust, so that, copyright clearance efforts are essentially futile,
copyright doctrine does not allow any particular latitude in making their
works available to the public.
These problems are magnified even further in light of the role that
Holocaust remembrance institutions play in Holocaust commemoration
and these institutions' vulnerability to copyright's chilling effects. The
only prospects for many orphan works created during the Holocaust to see
the light of day is through a Holocaust remembrance institution. 216 Yet, as
the foregoing discussion indicates, these institutions are especially risk
averse and sensitive to copyright's constraints, and may well refrain from
making such works available to the public.217 To illustrate, representatives
of the Holocaust Memorial Museum testified that since the institution is
unable to clear the rights and unwilling to assume even the minimal risk
of liability for copyright infringement, it may refrain from publishing
orphan works such as a diary of a young woman written in a Polish
ghetto, musical scores composed in concentration camps, or an album of
photographs discovered in Germany shortly after the War.2 18 Yet, it is
DIGITIZATION REPORT, supra note 91 (putting forth a series of recommendations designed to
overcome current obstacles to mass digitization due to the limitations of Section 108, including, inter-
alia, a legislative scheme of compulsory collective licenses for nonprofit educational and research
projects, with an opt-out right for copyright owners).
213. See Testimony of Holocaust Memorial Museum, supra note 25, at 62 (explaining that many
of the materials held by the Holocaust Memorial Museum are orphan works, and that the Museum
does not know whether the authors are dead, or who they might be).
214. In addition, most of these works were created in European jurisdictions, which usually
neither require nor maintain a copyright registry.
215. Id. (explaining that "often, even a diligent search is not successful").
216. See the discussion in Part I supra, notes 87-89 and the accompanying text. Cf Testimony of
Holocaust Memorial Museum, supra note 25, at 66 (explaining that orphan works held by the museum
have cultural and historical value, yet they are rarely works of intrinsic artistic value).
217. For an elaborated analysis of this point, see the discussion in Part I supra.
218. Testimony of Holocaust Memorial Museum, supra note 25, at 66.
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exactly the accumulation of such pieces of authentic, first-hand,
documentation that comprises the bricolage that tells the story of the
Holocaust, and plays a crucial role in overcoming the Holocaust's
problem of representation. 219 As the representative of the Holocaust
Memorial Museum eloquently stated (referring to the Museum's
collection of family photos), "each one of these photos alone has minimal
value . .. but the entire collection created a moving image of a community
destroyed in the Holocaust." 220
The fact that many of these anonymous works were not published by
their authors further complicates matters. 221 As discussed above, the
works' non-publication decreases the chances that a user wishing to make
these works available to the public would be able to rely on the fair use
doctrine. 222 Moreover, the combination of anonymity and non-publication
extends the duration of copyright to 120 years from the works' creation, 223
which implies that many of the orphan works created by Holocaust
victims during the 1940s will remain under copyright until the 2060s.
The emerging picture is that masses of anonymous works may be
absent from the publicly accessible Holocaust-related materials, due to
copyright constraints. This result may well affect the Holocaust's inter-
generational and collective memory. Importantly, the ultimate expiry of
copyright in these materials is unlikely to diminish its long-lasting impact.
In a world where access is increasingly synonymous with digitization,
there is no guarantee that future generations will be able to access
Holocaust-related materials that are not digitally archived today, even if
such materials are preserved in a physical form. The durability of
Holocaust-related materials, therefore, depends to a great extent upon an
ongoing, continuous engagement in these materials' digital preservation.
The rational tendency to wait until such materials fall into the public
domain, alongside the lack of clarity as to when exactly this moment will
arrive, is likely to relegate many of these materials to the fringes of (or
entirely exclude them from) the collective memory of the Holocaust.
Finally, the analysis in this section reveals, again, the paradox in
219. See the discussion in Part I supra, notes 61-65 and the accompanying text.
220. Testimony of Holocaust Memorial Museum, supra note 25, at 66-67.
221. Id. ("The majority [of the materials held by the Holocaust Memorial Museum] are foreign
works. Many of them are unpublished works, and many of them are orphan works").
222. See our discussion of publication v. concealment in Section III.B, supra.
223. See the combination of § 17 U.S.C. 302(c) (providing that "in the case of an anonymous
work, . . . the copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term
of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first") and § 17 U.S.C. 303 (a)
("copyright in a work created before January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the public domain or
copyrighted, subsists from January 1, 1978, and endures for the term provided by section 302. In no
case, however, shall the term of copyright in such a work expire before December 31, 2002; and, if
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applying ordinary copyright doctrine to Holocaust-related materials. The
accumulation of works created by victims facing genocide constitutes the
ultimate evidence of the realities of the Holocaust. Yet the mass murder of
those victims left their works practically immobilized, subject to a strict
copyright regime that undermines their ability to serve as testimony for
the mass atrocities that motivated their creation. 224
Altogether, the analysis in this Part demonstrates that the ordinary
copyright 'algorithm' reflects a narrative that is largely alien to the
circumstances that surrounded the creation of myriad Holocaust-related
materials. Applying copyright doctrine to these materials often yields both
moral dissonances and an undesirable impact on the Holocaust's
collective memory. Against this analysis, we proceed to outline several
doctrinal proposals that may help resolve some of the problems we
identified.
III. DOCTRINAL RECOMMENDATIONS
The following sections offer several normative recommendations
designed to overcome or mitigate some of the conflicts between copyright
law and the use of Holocaust-related materials. The overarching principle
guiding our recommendations is that in light of the significance of the
Holocaust and the unique combination of attributes described throughout
this article, copyright law should be applied to Holocaust-related
materials in a way that encourages the dissemination of knowledge about,
and remembrance of the Holocaust. We therefore propose to focus on
Holocaust-related materials as a distinct category of works and to
calibrate extant copyright doctrines to accommodate the particular
attributes of those works, through interpretative choices that do not
require statutory amendments. 225 Before delving into specific doctrines,
however, several clarifications are in order.
First, we do not attempt to provide an overarching solution to general
problems in copyright law discussed above, such as the problems of the
chilling effect or of mass digitization. Obviously, the solutions proposed
in the literature to some of these issues can also assist in resolving part of
the problems concerning Holocaust-related materials. However, we
submit that in the particular context of Holocaust-related materials, in
light of the unique combination of extraordinary attributes as described
224. For a detailed discussion of this paradox, see Section 11A, supra.
225. For a similar approach with respect to a different category of works, cf Michal Shur-Ofry,
Popularity as a Factor in Copyright Law 59 U. Toronto L. J. 525 (2009) (proposing to recognize
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above, there exist both justifications and appropriate doctrinal tools to
devise tailor-made doctrinal solutions that would apply specifically to
these materials.
Notably, while our analysis pertains only to Holocaust-related
materials, some of the attributes we highlight throughout this article may
also apply in additional cases of genocide and mass atrocities, and some
of our following suggestions-for example, applying the implied license
doctrine to materials created by victims facing genocide-might be
extended to such instances. Yet, the broader applicability of our analysis
to additional cases of genocide requires close scrutiny, and thus
constitutes a subject for future research.
Second, with respect to victims' works, the analysis in Part II indicates
that the core of the conflict with copyright lies is in the myriad cases of
anonymous and orphan works authored by victims who did not survive
the Holocaust or whose fate or identity are unknown. Hence, we confine
the proposals which pertain to victims' works to these types of works and
do not extend them to cases of identified Holocaust survivors.
Finally, we do not call for a general expiry of copyright in Holocaust-
related materials. As we show below, such a result is unfeasible under
existing law and may yield undesirable consequences in some cases.
Instead, we search for copyright doctrines that would allow more flexible,
context-based solutions, and could correspond the nuanced and diverse
circumstances at the interface of copyright and the Holocaust. The
discussion below therefore, concentrates on three specific doctrines: (1)
implied license; (2) copyright misuse; and (3) fair use. While the first is
particularly relevant with respect to victims' works, the second doctrine
may be useable with respect to Nazi-related materials, and the third, fair-
use doctrine, may apply to both types of materials.
The following paragraphs briefly review these doctrines and sketch, in
broad strokes, how they can be interpreted and calibrated to better
accommodate Holocaust-related materials.
A. Implied License
One existing mechanism to facilitate the use of works whose authors
are unknown or did not survive the Holocaust is the doctrine of implied
license.
Licensing the use of copyrighted works usually requires an explicit
contractual consent on part of the copyright owner.226 Yet, the court-made
doctrine of implied license provides that under certain circumstances a
226. 17 U.S.C. § 101 & § 204(a). See also See also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 156, at §
10. 03 [A] [7].
2018] 161
41
Pessach and Shur-Ofry: Copyright and the Holocaust
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
license may be implied, even in the absence of such consent.227 While
originally, the doctrine of implied license was used to supplement
contractual relations that already existed between parties, 228 it was
expanded in the case of Field v. Google to circumstances under which no
contractual relations existed.229 According to the Field court, implied
license may also apply "where the copyright holder knows of the use and
encourages it"; indeed, passive behavior on part of the copyright owner
may suffice. 23 0
Scholars greeted this development with enthusiasm. Scholarly
proposals advocate the further development of the doctrine as a non-
contractual means that could be used to inject a standard of
reasonableness into copyright law and allow the courts to legitimize
certain normatively desired uses, while taking into account broad policy
considerations. 231
Numerous Holocaust-related materials authored by victims constitute
paradigmatic candidates for applying the implied license doctrine. The
doctrine's underlying presumption-that under certain circumstances,
implied consent for the use a copyrighted work in specific manners
exists-is particularly applicable with respect to such materials. As the
discussion in Part II demonstrates, many of these materials-from semi-
structured archives of ghetto communities, to personal diaries, notes,
poems, and music-were created as acts of cultural and historical
preservation for future generations. 232 The wish to ensure the possibility
of such future use led to these works' burial in the ground, their
concealment underneath the ashes of the crematoria, or their deposit in the
hands of fellow prisoners.233 Such works' use by future generations for
the exact purposes for which they were created not only reflects the
227. For the doctrine's development and application by the courts, see, generally, Orit Fischman
Afori, Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in Copyright Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. &
HIGH TECH L.J.276, 292-300 (2008); John S. Sieman, Using the Implied License To Inject Common
Sense into Digital Copyright, 85 N.C. L. REV. 885, 890 (2007); Monika Isia Jasiewicz, Copyright
Protection in an Opt-out world: Implied License Doctrine and News Aggregators, 122 YALE L.J. 837
(2012).
228. See Fischman-Afori, supra note 227, at 285-86 ; Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d
555, 558-559 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a film producer that paid a copyright owner substantial
amounts for film footage had an implied license to use that footage).
229. Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
230. Field, 412F. Supp.2dat 1116.
231. See Sieman, supra note 227, at 915 and 925 (advocating a broad reading of Field and
arguing that implied license comprises useful means to fill in gaps in copyright law and calibrate the
law to technological developments); Jasiewicz, supra note 227, at 846-850 (advocating the extension
of the doctrine to facilitate the conduct of news aggregators); Fischman-Afori, supra note 227, at 280-
281 and 324-25 (positing a general argument for the use of implied license to inject an objective
standard into copyright law).
232. Part II supra, particularly notes 107-121 and the accompanying text.
233. See the discussion in Part II.A(1) and Part I1.B supra.
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implied consent of their authors, but also often amounts to fulfillment of
their explicit wishes.234 Hence, applying the implied license doctrine to
enable these uses is warranted.
Moreover, the doctrine of implied license is particularly appropriate in
such cases, since it does not amount to a complete expiry of copyright
protection, but rather preserves a nucleus of authorial rights. Therefore,
the uses that can be authorized under the doctrine are ohly those that
presumably are consistent with the victims' intent, as can be inferred from
their works and the surrounding circumstances. To illustrate, let us return
for a minute to the opera the Kaiser von Atlantis. 235 The preparation of the
opera for its London performance many years after the Holocaust
encountered a curious intervention from a famous London medium, who
claimed that the dead Viktor Ullmann (the opera's composer) dictated to
her some musical revisions posthumously. 236 The producers rejected the
attempt to revise the work and decided "as far as practicable to perform
the opera in the state that Kien and Ullmann had left it in 1943."237 This
decision seems consistent with the doctrine of implied license: the
circumstances surrounding the opera's creation, its reflection of the
horrors of the Holocaust through artistic means, and its deposit in the
hand of a fellow prisoner in the hope it will be rescued all imply a license
to third parties to perform the opera on stage. 238 Yet, changes to the
original opera inserted by a third party would not be covered by that
implied license.
We do not ignore the uncertainty as to whether the decision in Field v.
Google alone can carry the weight of applying the implied license
doctrine to Holocaust-related works. The main difficulty is the court's
requirement that the copyright owners "knows of the use and encourages
it,"239 which cannot apply literally to the myriad works of anonymous
victims, most of whom did not survive the Holocaust. However, the
analysis above indicates that these are exactly the instances where
leniency is justified, whereas a strict application of copyright law might
leave materials immobilized against their authors' wishes. Therefore, we
argue for a broad interpretation of the doctrine that would extend it to
234. Id.
235. Introduction supra, notes 9-13 and the accompanying text.
236. For the details of this curious story, see Graubaft, supra note 9, at 86-88 (explaining that the
medium was apparently enlisted by the conductor who prepared the work for its first performance in
Amsterdam).
237. Id. at 88. Notably, Graubart, who was one of the London production's producers, recounts
that the Dutch version of the opera did incorporate some of the revisions that the medium had
suggested.
238. Cf Bilstiger, supra note 10, at 6 (comparing the opera to a "message in a bottle").
239. Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006).
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those instances. 240
We also acknowledge that under current copyright law, the doctrine of
implied license, even in combination with calibration of the fair use
doctrine (as discussed below), may be insufficient to provide a complete
solution to the problem of orphan works and mass digitization of
Holocaust-related materials. Yet, if both doctrines are developed in the
manner suggested here, their cumulative application will provide a
significant tool that would considerably mitigate the dissonance of
Holocaust victims' works that are locked in by the copyright regime. 241
B. Copyright Misuse
How can copyright doctrine be calibrated to treat Holocaust-related
materials created by the Nazi regime and its collaborators? We do not
advocate here a complete denial of copyright in such materials. Indeed,
recent scholarship has addressed the problems entailed in affording full
copyright protection to works whose contents are illegal or immoral. 242
However, a result which completely denies copyright in such materials
seems unfeasible under the current doctrinal regime, in light of
copyright's "content neutrality" principle which is traditionally perceived
as protecting free speech values. 2 4 3 This latter position is not free of
difficulties, and deserves a thorough analysis that exceeds the scope of
this article. We leave it for another day. 24 4 In the following paragraphs we
explore another doctrinal solution, which does not entail a complete
expiry of copyright. We submit that the evolving doctrine of copyright
240. Cf Fischman-Afori, supra note 227, at 280-81, 324-25 (discussing the extended application
of the implied license doctrine in patent law and proposing a similar extension in copyright law);
Sieman, supra note 227, at 915 and 925 (advocating a broad reading of Field, to advance socially
beneficial outcomes).
241. Part I, supra.
242. See Anne Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography 91 Oregon L. Rev. 1 (2012); Eldar
Haber, Copyrighted Crimes: The Copyrightability of Illegal Works, 16 YALE J. L. AND TECH. 454
(2014); Snow, supra note 147 and the accompanying text.
243. See note 147 supra, and the accompanying text. Cf the recent decision of the Supreme Court
in Matal v. Tam 582 U.S. (2017) (holding that a provision under the Lanham Act which allows to
refuse the registration of trademarks on the basis, inter alia, of "immoral" nature, is unconstitutional
and conflicts with the First Amendment). For recent scholarship criticizing "aesthetic neutrality"
principles, see Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in Copyright
Law: A Community of Practice Standard, 109 Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (2015) (arguing that implicit
aesthetic criteria are deeply embedded in copyright law); Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgement in Law,
69 ALA. L. REv. 381 (2017) (arguing that the arguments for refraining from aesthetic judgements in
the law are generally unconvincing).
244. Briefly, we do not overlook problems of boundary-drawing and the moral choices that are
embedded in alleviating the content-neutrality principle. However, we argue that because affording
ordinary copyright protection to Nazi works renders these works ordinary and carries aesthetic and
moral implications, the "neutrality" principle itself is far from neutral, but rather is laden with
inevitable moral choices. For further elaboration of this point, see Guy Pessach & Michal Shur-Ofry,
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misuse could apply with respect the use of Holocaust-related materials
created by the Nazi regime and its collaborators.
Similar to the implied license doctrine, copyright misuse is also a court-
made doctrine. 245 It is based upon the principle that, in certain exceptional
cases, the protection afforded by copyright should withdraw in favor of
the public interest. 24 6 While copyright misuse was applied in many cases
that involved antitrust considerations, both case law and scholars indicate
that the doctrine need not be confined to such circumstances, but rather
reflects broader public policy considerations. 247 As the court noted in the
case of Lasercomb v. Reynolds:
[M]isuse need not be a violation of antitrust law in order to
comprise an equitable defense to an infringement action. The
question is not whether the copyright is being used in a manner
violative of antitrust law . . . but whether the copyright is being
used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the
grant of a copyright. 248
The latter statement clarifies the relevance of copyright misuse in our
context. Ordinary copyright protection of Nazi materials is difficult to
justify on the basis of the "public policy embodied in the grant of a
copyright." 249 Moreover, the discussion in the previous parts
demonstrated that enabling perpetrators to rely on ordinary copyright law
as a means to control the use of their works and receive royalties for their
utilization yields anomalous consequences and produces a chilling effect
on the Holocaust's commemoration. 25 0 Therefore, policy and equitable
considerations, in their broader sense, seem to justify the denial of full
enforceability of copyright in these materials, in order to mitigate the
distortions that we discussed earlier: first, the moral distortion in
recognizing Nazi materials as 'ordinary' copyrighted works worthy of
245. For principal cases recognizing the doctrine, see Lasercomb Inc. v. Reynolds 911 F2d 970,
979 (4'. Cir. 1990); Alcatel USA Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc 166 F3d. 772, 793 (5'. Cir. 1999);
Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical Association 121 F3d 516 (9'. Cir.
1997). See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, 11:38-11:39 (3rd. ed., 2015).
246. See, generally, Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of
Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software 15 BERKLEY TECH. L. J., 865,
901-902 (2000); Ramsey Hanna, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse
Standards, 46 STANFORD LAW REV. 401 (1994); Tom Bell, Codifying Copyright's Misuse Defense
2007 UTAH L. REV. 573; Kathryn Judge, Rethinking Copyright Misuse 57 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2004);
Shur-Ofry, supra note 225, at 574-75.
247, See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 245, at 11:41-11:42 (objecting to limiting the doctrine to cases
of antitrust infringement, and noting that "the majority of copyright misuse decisions today explicitly
or implicitly reject any requirement that copyright misuse must also constitute an antitrust violation").
248. Lasercomb Inc. v. Reynolds 911 F2d 970, 979 (4*. Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
249. See Part II supra, notes 102-105 and the accompanying text; Cf Bartow, supra note at pp.
3-4 (arguing that pornographic materials cannot reasonably be construed as promoting "progress" or
"useful arts").
250. See Part II supra, notes 121-145 and the accompanying text.
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protection, entitling their creators to a stamp of authorship and their
successors to a financial reward; and second, the paradox that arises when
copyright in these works serves as a mechanism affecting the collective
memory and history of the Holocaust. 251 Thus, overall, employing the
copyright misuse doctrine in order to bar harmful enforcement of
copyright in these materials is theoretically consistent with the raison
d'8tre of the doctrine.
Similar to the implied license doctrine, copyright misuse as well is not
tantamount to a complete expiry of copyright. Rather, its application
prevents the enforcement of copyright in certain cases. 25 2 Thus, the
doctrine allows some sensitivity to the context and circumstances under
which enforcement is sought. For example, under this analysis, requiring
the payment of royalties for the use of excerpts from Triumph of the Will
in a post-War film about the Nazi regime 25 3 or for the use of quotations
from Goebbels' diaries in a book 25 4 would constitute copyright misuse. So
would the use of copyright by Hitler's authorized publishers in order to
prevent the distribution of the full text of Mein Kampf during Hitler's rise
to power.255 On the other hand, the use of copyright in Mein Kampf by the
government of Bavaria (which became the legal owner of the rights after
the War) during the post-War years in order to prevent the further
dissemination of the Nazi ideology would not necessarily give rise to a
copyright misuse defense. 256
Indeed, in some cases, the fair use doctrine (which we discuss below)
may supplement or overlap with copyright misuse. Yet, in the
circumstances we are concerned with, copyright misuse has an advantage
over fair use: while the focus of fair use is on the conduct of the defendant
using the work, the focus of copyright misuse is on the unclean hands and
harmful conduct of the copyright owner.257 Consequently, the doctrine of
copyright misuse entails an expressive element of illuminating and
delegitimizing the copyright owner's conduct. 25 8 As such, this principle
251. See Part II.A(2), supra.
252. Goldstein, supra note 245, at 11:32 (32 (explaining that the prevalent view is that the rights
do not expire but are unenforceable, "at least until the taint is purged").
253. For the story of Triumph of the Will and the legal proceedings initiated by Riefenstahl, see
Part I supra, notes 122-131 and the accompanying text.
254. For the copyright litigation concerning the citation of paragraphs from Goebbels' diaries,
and the decisions of the German courts, see supra, notes 137-137 and the accompanying text.
255. For the copyright claims filed by Hitler's publishers in order to prevent the dissemination of
the full text of Mein Kampf, see the discussion in Introduction supra, notes 14-23 and the
accompanying text.
256. For the policy of Bavaria with regard to Mein Kampf in the post-War years, and its reliance
on copyright, see Caesar C. Aronsfeld, Mein Kampf 1945-1982, 45 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES 311
(1983).
257. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 245, at 11:41.
258. Id. at 11:47 (explaining that fair use asks "whether the user's conduct is salutary," whereas
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may constitute a particularly suitable doctrinal vehicle to alleviate the
moral distortions entailed in copyright protection of materials created by
the Nazi regime and its collaborators.
. Copyright misuse is currently an evolving doctrine, and one of the
challenges courts face is identifying categories of cases that may
constitute copyright misuse, so as to award the doctrine a "measure of
predictability."25 9 Our proposal in this context is to recognize Holocaust-
related works created by the Nazis and their collaborators as a relevant
category within the framework of the copyright misuse doctrine. 260 Such
recognition is not only consistent with the doctrine's rationales but will
also assist in its further development.
C. Fair Use
Finally, we propose to calibrate the fair use doctrine to better
accommodate the properties of Holocaust-related materials. The
foregoing discussion demonstrated two major difficulties in the
application of the fair use doctrine to such materials: first, courts'
reluctance to acknowledge fair use in the case of unpublished materials
(primarily relevant to materials authored by victims); 2 6 1 and second, the
judicial inclination to prefer transformative and partial uses over the bare
utilization of an entire copyrighted work 'as is' (which is relevant to
materials created by either victims or perpetrators). 262 These problems can
be partially resolved by adopting certain interpretive choices when
applying the fair use doctrine to Holocaust-related materials. The holistic
nature of the fair use inquiry and its embedded flexibility would allow
courts to adopt the interpretations we propose here and take into account
the unusual circumstances surrounding Holocaust related materials.
(1) The Nature of the Work: Holocaust-Related Materials
The second factor in the statutory provision instructs the courts to
consider "the nature of the copyrighted work" as part of the fair use
analysis. 26 3 Apart from the case of unpublished works (which courts
consider under this factor, and which we will discuss shortly), the nature
of the work is regarded the least important among the fair'use factors.2 64
copyright misuse inquires whether the owner's conduct is "harmful").
259. Id at 11:41.
260. Cf Shur-Ofry, supra note 225, at 575 (arguing that identifying categories of works within
the framework of copyright misuse will increase the doctrine's predictability).
261. Part II.B, supra.
262. Part IIC, supra.
263. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) ("in determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include ... (2) the nature of the copyrighted work").
264. See Beebe, supra note 155, at 610 (providing empirical evidence of the limited weight that
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The general approach is that the more creative the work is, the more
would this factor weigh in favor of the copyright owner, and vice versa.265
Yet apart from this distinction, the nature of the work does not receive
considerable weight under the fair use analysis.
We propose to recognize Holocaust-related works as a distinct category
of works under the nature of the work prong of the fair use doctrine
(regardless of their level of creativity). In other words, if the work in
question is a Holocaust-related work, this factor would weigh in favor of a
fair use finding. The primary justifications for this proposal arise from our
previous analysis; 266 namely, the vital role of these materials in the
perception and commemoration of the Holocaust and in overcoming the
problem of representation; the convincing policy reasons not to award
ordinary copyright protection to Holocaust-related materials created by
the Nazi regime, and-with respect to materials authored by victims-the
moral imperative (often reflected in the authors' explicit wishes) to
disseminate these works and expose them to future generations. The
combination of these considerations implies that copyright law should
demonstrate particular leniency toward the use of Holocaust-related
materials.
In addition, our proposal to recognize Holocaust-related materials as a
relevant category within.the fair use doctrine is largely consistent with the
fourth factor of the doctrine, which instructs the courts to examine "the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work." 267 In many cases, the preservation of and the provision of access to
Holocaust-related works will not harm their value or potential markets.
Often, the historical-cultural value of Holocaust-related materials does not
easily translate into actual market value. Works such as letters, personal
notes, sketches, or drawings may not be able to compete in a regular
artistic market; yet, their combination creates a whole that is greater than
the sum of its components-a valuable bricolage of life during the
courts grant the second factor of the fair use defense); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 156, at §
13.05[A][2][a] (stating that "notwithstanding that general pronouncement, this second factor more
typically recedes into insignificance in the greater fair use calculus").
265. Beebe, supra note 155, at 611 (presenting empirical evidence that courts grant considerable
weight to the degree of the work's creativity within the framework of the second factor); NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 156, at § 13.05[A][2][a] (stating that "it has been said that, with respect to 'a
work more of diligence than of originality or inventiveness' such as a catalog, index or other
compilation, there is a 'greater license' to use portions of such a work under the doctrine of fair use
than would be the case 'if a creative work had been involved.' . . . the scope of fair use is greater
when informational type works, as opposed to more creative products are involved . . . . If a work is
more appropriately characterized as entertainment, it is less likely that a claim of fair use will be
accepted").
266. Parts I & IIA, supra.
267. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) ("in determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include ... (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work").
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Holocaust.268 Moreover, the previous analysis indicates that the market-
oriented framework of copyright law is often 'inapplicable to Holocaust-
related works created by victims. It also indicates that there are good
policy reasons for copyright law to avoid creating or protecting a market
for Nazi materials.
We do not argue that there would never be a market for Holocaust-
related works, or that it would always be unjustified to consider that
market. We claim that as a general matter, in light of the circumstances
underlying the creation of Holocaust-related works, the doctrinal leverage
should lie in the second factor of the fair use doctrine (the work's nature),
and that (again, as a general matter) the fourth, market, factor should not
bar a finding of fair use.
(2) Unpublished Holocaust-Related Works in Context
The previous analysis illuminated the conflict between the weight that
copyright law affords to unpublished works as a factor that considers
against fair use on the one hand, and the common burial and concealment
of materials created by victims during the Holocaust in an attempt to
ensure their future dissemination, on the other hand.2 69
Therefore, we submit that where Holocaust-related materials are
concerned, the unpublished nature of the work should not weigh against
fair use. To a large extent, our proposal is consistent with the 1992
statutory amendment of the fair use provision.27 0 Our argument is also
consistent with the legislative history of the amendment, which indicates
that it was designed to increase the ability of biographers, historians, and
publishers to use unpublished primary materials such as copyrighted
letters and diaries.271 More significantly, however, our proposal does not
conflict with the rationale underlying the law's reserved approach toward
unpublished works. As previously explained, the purpose of the
268. See the discussion in Part I supra, note 89 and the accompanying text.
269. Part II.B, supra.
270. Act of Oct. 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (providing that "[tihe fact that a
work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration
of all the above factors"). But see the discussion supra, notes 154-155 and the accompanying text
(indicating that the unpublished nature of a work still carries weight under the fair use analysis). Our
proposal is also consistent with Nimmer's position, that the fair use doctrine should be considerably
narrower where the authors sought the confidentiality of the unpublished work, in comparison to
cases where no confidentiality was sought by the authors-see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 156,
at § 13.05[AJ[2][b][ii].
271. Thus, several senators stated that the amendment "applies to uses of letters, diaries and other
unpublished copyrighted works" but does not "broaden the fair use of unpublished computer
programs [or secure tests]." See 138 Cong. Rec. Sl7358 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992) (statement of Sens.
Simon, Leahy, Kennedy, Grassley, Metzenbaum, and Kohl); S. Rep. No. 102-141, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1991); H.R. Rep. No. 102-286, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992). See also Lynn Miller, Fair
Use, Biographies, and Unpublished Works: Life After H.R. 4412, 40 J. COPR. SoCY 349, 395 (1993).
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distinction between published and unpublished works is to provide
authors with the power and discretion to determine whether and when
their works will be made public. 272 In the context of Holocaust-victims'
works, however, the choice to publish in real time was virtually non-
existent. The authors' wish to make their works publicly accessible was
expressed either explicitly-as in the case of the History of the Kovno
Jewish Ghetto Police, or the Oyneg Shabes archive-or implicitly by the
mere attempt to rescue the works.273 Therefore, in those cases, the
unpublished nature of the works should not function to prevent a finding
of fair use.
(3) Beyond Transformative Uses
Finally, our analysis also suggests a new interpretation of the first and
third factors of the fair use doctrine.2 74 The discussion throughout this
article illuminated the significance of using entire, authentic, unabridged
Holocaust-related materials in order to minimize the Holocaust's problem
of representation and convey its realities to future generations. 275 This
insight applies both to the use of victims' works and to materials created
by the Nazi perpetrators. 276 We also demonstrated that such uses may
conflict with the dominance of the transformative use paradigm within
fair use jurisprudence, as well as with the doctrine's preference for partial
uses over uses of entire copyrighted materials. 277 Against this background,
we propose that in appropriate circumstances, the use of Holocaust-
related materials in their entirety would be recognized as fair use, even
when such use is not transformative by nature.
Our proposal may find support in the views expressed by some courts,
that a transformative use is not a sine-qua-non requirement for a finding
of fair use. 2 78 It is also consistent with the scholarship that highlights the
272. Part II.B supra, notes 156-165 and the accompanying text.
273. Id.
274. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) & (3): ("in determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include ... (1) the purpose and character
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes ... [and] (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole").
275. Parts I & IL.C supra.
276. See the discussion in III.C supra, notes 180-191 and the accompanying text.
277. Part II.C, supra. The transformative-ness of the use is considered as part of the first statutory
factor, while the preference for partial uses relies on the third factor.
278. See, e.g., Sarl Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) ("transformative use is not a requirement for a finding of fair use, but 'the more transformative
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh
against a finding of fair use."'). Cf Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F.Supp. 130, 146
(D.C.N.Y 1968) (holding that the use of frames from Zapruder's film documenting the Kennedy
assassination constituted fair use, while acknowledging the public interest "to have the fullest
information available on the murder of President Kennedy", and the defendants' difficulty to explain
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significance of unadorned reproductions of copyrighted works for
protecting speech-related values. 279 The primary justification for our
proposal is the inimitable value of access to authentic, unabridged,
Holocaust-related materials for the formation of the Holocaust's
collective memory and historical narratives. Yet as previously explained,
transcending the transformative use paradigm is also vital for the
subsequent transformative uses of original Holocaust-related materials.
This is so because the availability of such materials for secondary,
transformative uses largely depends on primary non-transformative uses,
namely upon their initial digitization and upon making them available to
the public by Holocaust remembrance institutions. 28 0
Altogether, the analysis in this Part indicates that the current copyright
regime can calibrate its doctrinal tools, through interpretation of existing
doctrines, so as to better accommodate Holocaust-related materials. The
proposals above are non-exhaustive, and do not provide comprehensive
solutions to each and every case of Holocaust-related materials. Yet,
jointly, they could help in mitigating some of the conflicts at the interface
of copyright and the Holocaust.
CONCLUSION
Our exploration of the interface between copyright and the Holocaust
reveals an area fraught with tensions and conflicts. Copyright's ordinary
narrative is often ill-suited to treat Holocaust-related materials, created
under conditions that were anything but ordinary. Thus, on the one hand,
a regular application of copyright to such materials can stifle the voices of
Holocaust victims who attempted to send us a "message in a bottle." On
the other hand, it may normalize Nazi materials and render them
administratively ordinary, while granting the Holocaust perpetrators (and
their successors) a certain control over the Holocaust memory. Our
analysis indicates that extant copyright law should be sensitive to these
dissonances and presents several normative recommendations that may
alleviate some of the tensions.
Our focus here is solely on the Holocaust. Yet, the scheme we propose
here may be applicable to additional cases of genocide, which may have
their theory with sketches, rather than frames from the original film). The latter case, however,
preceded the transformative-use era in U.S. copyright law. Cf Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense
of Fair Use, 15 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 715, 770 (2011) (explaining that the delineation of what
exactly falls within this category of non-transformative fair-uses remains relatively unclear).
279. See Tushnet, supra note 169, and the discussion in Part IIC, notes 178-179 and the
accompanying text.
280. See the discussion in Part lI.C, notes 192-193 and the accompanying text.
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involved concealment practices, masses of anonymous works, or other
extreme attributes similar to the ones explored above. This application,
however, would require a close scrutiny of the attributes and
circumstances surrounding each such case, and exceeds the scope of this
article. Therefore, while acknowledging the potential broader relevance of
our analysis or parts thereof to other cases of genocide, we leave this issue
to future research.
Our study further illuminates the (largely overlooked) role of copyright
in shaping the Holocaust's collective memory. This exploration reveals
the limitations and shortcomings of the copyright system in dealing with
questions concerning the inter-generational memory of the Holocaust. The
Holocaust is perhaps the most influential case in the study of social
memory. The analysis of its interface with copyright law demonstrates
how our memory of the past is constructed by the present copyright
regime. More generally, it can deepen our understanding of copyright's
impact on collective memory and social remembrance. The latter, broader
question requires further research.
Finally, the exploration initiated in this study is far from
comprehensive. Our journey to the boundaries of copyright and the
Holocaust reveals that this interface is comprised of numerous legal,
cultural, and historical facets; of myriad stories and case studies; of
institutional, social, and individual interests. All these aspects warrant
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